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DIVERGENCE OF RISK INDICATORS AND THE 
CONDITIONS FOR MARKET DISCIPLINE IN BANKING
Jens Forssbæck
Abstract
Accurate measurement of bank risk is a matter of considerable importance for
bank regulation and supervision. Current practices in most countries emphasize
reliance on financial statement data for assessing banks’ risk. However, the pos-
sibility of increased reliance on market-based risk indicators has been a topic for
academic and regulatory debate for a long time. Market monitoring of bank risk
has typically been tested by regressing market-based risk indicators on various
benchmark indicators (such as accounting ratios and credit ratings) to detect
whether the market tracks bank risk. This approach overlooks the methodologi-
cal ‘unobservability’ problem that testing one imperfect proxy indicator against
another, when the true value (in this case, a bank’s ‘true’ risk) is unknown, must
yield limited conclusions as to the appropriateness of either indicator – particu-
larly in the event of failure to establish a significant association. This paper
assesses the relative information content of different risk indicators indirectly by
associating the divergence between these indicators with the institutional setting.
Empirical results for a large panel of banks worldwide suggest that market-based
indicators are often more accurate than accounting indicators for high levels of
institutional quality. In particular, spreads on subordinated debt may be more
informative than either equity-based or accounting-based measures if the institu-
tional conditions for market discipline to function are favourable. In addition, a
combination measure incorporating both accounting and market data has supe-
rior accuracy regardless of the level of institutional quality, indicating that market
data may contain complementary information on risk. These results cast doubt
on the validity of the conclusions drawn in several previous studies that reject
market discipline based on the finding that market-based risk indicators do not
correspond well with various standard non-market indicators.
1. INTRODUCTION
Accurate measurement of banks’ risk is important for several reasons. Regulators
need to keep track of banks’ risk behaviour because of the particular incentive
structure facing banks (especially bank shareholders) due to their financing pat-
tern, which is in large part insured debt, and because of the potential systemic
consequences of excessive risk taking in banks. In addition, many recent proposals
for improvement of bank regulation depend on accurate measurement of banks’
risk (such as risk-based capital adequacy requirements, risk-based deposit insur-
ance premia, etc.). Current practices among regulators in most countries empha-
size reliance on financial statement data for the measurement of banks’ risk (see,
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e.g., European Commission, 2008). However, the possibility of increased reliance
on market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is a long-standing issue of study
and debate for academics and regulators (see, e.g., Calomiris, 1999).
Market discipline (in banking) is commonly defined as a combination of moni-
toring and influence (see, e.g., Flannery, 2001; Bliss and Flannery, 2002), where
‘monitoring’ refers to the process whereby market participants (holders of vari-
ous classes of bank capital) collect information on the bank’s financial condition
and market prices on bank claims reflect this information, and ‘influence’ refers
to the market’s capacity to actually get the bank to adjust its risk behaviour in
accordance with the signals generated by fluctuations in market prices.
Primarily, research interest has circled around the former aspect of market disci-
pline: can market prices on banks’ outstanding securities be relied upon to convey
accurate and useful information about banks’ risk? The vast majority of papers
testing the risk sensitivity of market prices perform (linear) regressions of some
market-based measure of bank risk (e.g. the spreads on the bank’s subordinated
debt) on a set of other risk measures – typically accounting information and/or
ratings. The establishment of a significant relationship between the market-based
measure and the benchmark measure(s) is interpreted as a sign that the market
adequately prices risk, and thus that market discipline would be a useful mecha-
nism to restrain excessive risk taking by banks. Equally importantly, failure to
establish a significant relationship is interpreted as absence of market discipline.
There are several methodological problems with this general approach (including,
for instance, various specification problems related to functional form, omitted
variables, etc. – see, e.g., Gorton and Santomero, 1990, and Pennacchi, 2001). In
this paper, I focus on the fact that this general approach (and thus much of the
empirical literature in this field) overlooks an unobservability problem, which
limits the scope for interpreting the results in terms of the prospects for market
discipline in general. The problem essentially lies in benchmarking one imperfect
proxy (based on market prices) on other imperfect proxies (based on accounting
information, ratings, etc.) of an unknown fundamental variable, viz. ‘true’ risk.
It is not possible to know a priori which proxy contains the more accurate infor-
mation on risk, and therefore – in the event of failure to establish a statistically
significant association between the left-hand side variable and the right-hand side
variable(s) – it is not possible to infer which side of the equation is ‘wrong’. Using
accounting information, ratings, and other commonly used risk proxies as bench-
marks effectively entails restricting the definition of ‘success’ to correspondence
with another, already available and imperfect measure. The implication is that (i)
market prices can never contain more (useful) information than the benchmark
measures (and whenever market prices do not correspond with the benchmark
measures they are irrelevant), and (ii) therefore, indirect market discipline as a
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supervisory tool is superfluous, because all the information we need or could
possibly hope to extract is already incorporated in already available measures. In
a manner of speaking, market information is then not ‘allowed’ to contain any
more information than we already have.
The purpose of this paper is to devise and implement a simple methodology which
addresses this unobservability problem, and by which it is possible to identify if,
which, and under what circumstances, market-based measures may contain more
information than certain common benchmark measures. This is an important
question for assessing the potential merits of market discipline, because although
it may be relatively uncontroversial to suggest that market-based risk indicators
contain complementary information, one of the points with market discipline is
that the indicators are observed continuously (whereas, e.g., financial statement
data are only observed at an annual or quarterly basis). It is therefore of interest
to assess the informativeness of market-based indicators individually.
The paper uses an unobserved-variables approach to associate the divergence
between different risk indicators on the one hand, with proxies of the conditions
for market discipline to function on the other (these conditions are mainly various
indicators of institutional quality), and identifies implied functional relationships
of differences in relative information content in the included risk measures. The
approach is essentially a systematization of the simple idea that if the disconnec-
tion between a market-based risk indicator and some benchmark indicator is
greater when the conditions for market discipline are well satisfied (that is, when
market-based risk measures should be relatively accurate), then it may be the
benchmark indicator, rather than the market-based indicator, that is relatively less
informative.
The methodology is implemented empirically on a panel of several hundred
banks worldwide between the years 1994 and 2005. The results suggest that
market-based risk measures are less informative than accounting indicators of
risk for most levels of institutional quality, but that market-based indicators are
often more informative if the conditions for market discipline to work are well
satisfied (if the institutional quality is high). Specifically, spreads on subordi-
nated debt are more informative than accounting-based risk indicators for the
highest level of institutional quality. On the other hand, stock return volatility
proves to be less informative than the accounting indicators for all observed
levels of institutional quality. A combination measure incorporating both
accounting and market data, finally, has superior accuracy regardless of the level
of institutional quality, indicating that market data always contains complemen-
tary information on risk.
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 contains a selective review
of literature addressing the conditions for market discipline and a brief run-down
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of empirical literature testing market monitoring in banking. Section 3 describes
the methodology and develops the hypotheses, whereas Section 4 presents the
estimation methods and the data. In Section 5, the empirical results are reported,
and Section 6, finally, concludes.
2. MARKET DISCIPLINE AND BANK RISK – CONCEPTS, 
RESULTS, AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
2.1. Market discipline
In principle, any holder of a risky claim on the bank which is tradable on a market
could instil market discipline on banks. Holders and prospective buyers of the
claim would have an incentive to monitor the bank’s risk taking, and would there-
fore discipline banks’ risk-taking directly, by (incrementally) influencing the
bank’s cost of capital, and indirectly, by providing a signal (in the form of the
market price of the claim) to the bank itself, to the supervisory authority, and to
other stakeholders, of the market’s assessment of the bank’s risk behaviour. Indi-
rect market discipline could be imposed, e.g., by using such price signals as trig-
gers for prompt corrective action (PCA) or for on-site examinations by the super-
visory authority, or as basis for setting risk-adjusted deposit insurance premia.
The indirect and direct dimensions of market discipline are captured by the
widely used definition of market discipline as a combination of monitoring and
influence (see, e.g., Flannery, 2001; Bliss and Flannery, 2002). Monitoring cap-
tures the information aspect of market discipline: current and prospective claim-
ants on the bank inform themselves of the bank’s condition and set prices on their
claims accordingly. Influence refers to the mechanism by which banks, in order
to avoid the adverse consequences of stronger discipline (such as higher financing
costs and closer monitoring by market participants as well as regulators) decrease
their risk exposure (or, indeed, avoid increasing it in the first place).
The literature on market discipline in banking is mostly empirical (see next sub-
section), but more or less implicit in the empirical applications are assumptions
on a couple of underlying questions, which have received some – but rather lim-
ited – treatment elsewhere. The first relates to the conditions under which market
discipline can be expected to ‘work’ – i.e., a systematization of the basic require-
ments on the institutional setting that need to be satisfied for the market to (be
able to) fulfil its task as disciplinarian. The second concerns whether market
prices of some classes of claims on banks are better able to produce useful signals
of bank risk. This second question is related to the first one insofar as its answer
may depend on differences in the extent to which the conditions for market dis-
cipline are satisfied for different classes of claims on the bank.
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As a general treatment of the first question, Lane (1993) sets up four conditions
for market discipline to work1: (i) open capital markets; (ii) good information
about a borrower’s existing liabilities2; (iii) no prospect of a bailout (the supplier
of financing must not benefit from third-party guarantees issued on the claim);
and (iv) responsiveness of the borrower to market signals. Of these four condi-
tions for market discipline in general, the first three concern primarily the moni-
toring aspect, whereas the fourth directly reflects the influence aspect. The mon-
itoring aspect of market discipline is equivalent to the requirement that market
signals accurately reflect risk; if they do, then the conditions for market monitor-
ing of risk are satisfied. Therefore, market monitoring (the extent to which risk
information is impounded in market prices) is conditioned on the openness of
capital markets, the quality of the available information about the issuer of the
security, and whether or not there are guarantees or insurance attached to the
claim. However, if monitoring is costly, it is unlikely that market participants will
expend costs for monitoring banks that are unresponsive to market signals
(Llewellyn, 2005); thus, the monitoring aspect of market discipline is somewhat
conditional on the influence aspect, so that the expectation of finding risk-rele-
vant information in market prices becomes conditional on all four conditions. I
will rely on this general grouping of market-discipline conditions in the empirical
part of the paper.
The answer to the question if some types of claimants are more apt to exert
market discipline than others is more ambiguous. One class of debtholders usu-
ally precluded from the discussion altogether, however, are (small) deposit hold-
ers. They are generally considered more or less immune to bank risk, since under
deposit insurance, they have little incentive to monitor bank risk and instil mar-
ket discipline. On the other hand, it is often considered that holders of risky debt
(such as unsecured, or subordinated, bonds and notes) would act as better mon-
itors of bank risk than equity holders (see, for instance, Calomiris, 1999;
Evanoff and Wall, 2000; Sironi, 2001; Benink and Wihlborg, 2002). The argu-
ment largely rests on the notion that the risk-shifting incentives of shareholders
resulting from the option value of equity in the presence of deposit insurance
(Merton, 1977) make shareholders too inclined toward risk to serve as effective
disciplinarians. Conversely, the focus of bondholders on downside risk means
that their incentives are more or less in line with those of the supervisor/deposit
insurer, and consequently that prices of uninsured debt would better reflect
default risk (or at least be a more relevant risk meter for supervisors) than equity
prices.
1 Lane presumes a debt claim, but these conditions for market discipline should hold more generally for any type
of risky claim.
2 Presumably, one would add to this information about the borrower’s assets and/or income streams.
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It is not clear if this argument stands up to closer inspection. The relatively scant
theoretical research that exists (Levonian, 2001; Nivorozhkin, 2005) suggests
that spreads on subordinated debt would more accurately reflect default risk than
equity prices only under certain conditions (associated with, inter alia, the relative
shares of insured and uninsured debt, and the magnitude of bankruptcy costs).
Some criticism voiced against the idea of relying on debt market discipline rests
on the more mundane and practical point that stock markets are typically much
more liquid than debt markets, and that bond spreads would be noisy signals of
risk because the risk information is obfuscated by large liquidity premia (see, e.g.,
Saunders, 2001). The question whether stock prices or bond spreads better reflect
bank risk is therefore to some extent an empirical one.
I next turn to a brief run-down of some main empirical results, and then turn to
the particular methodological problem that is the focus of interest in this paper.
2.2. Evidence on market monitoring of bank risk
Tests of monitoring by holders of risky bank claims have typically been conducted
by one of two main approaches. The first general method – which I will hence-
forth refer to as the ‘risk-sensitivity approach’ – consists in regressing some mar-
ket-based risk indicator on a set of benchmark risk measures (typically credit
ratings and/or various accounting ratios) and control variables. If the benchmark
risk measures are found to be significant determinants of the market signal, the
result is taken as evidence of market self-regulation of bank risk; conversely,
absence of significant associations between the market and the benchmark indi-
cator(s) is interpreted as a rejection of market monitoring.
In the other main approach – which may be termed the ‘early-warning approach’
– market-based risk measures are tested as predictors, or leading indicators of
actual bank failure, of insolvency, or of general deterioration of financial status
(defined in different ways). Both these general approaches have been applied to
both equity- and debt-based risk indicators with varying results. In what follows,
I will focus on the risk-sensitivity approach.
A number of early studies test the sensitivity of the interest cost of large (and
hence uninsured) certificates of deposit (CDs) or of the spreads on subordinated
notes and debentures (SNDs) issued by US banks during the 1980s to various
accounting measures of risk, using straightforward linear regression specifica-
tions. The results of these studies are, taken together, fairly inconclusive: whereas,
for instance, Avery et al. (1988) and James (1990) find little evidence of account-
ing risk reflected in debt prices, other studies find that CD rates or SND spreads
are significantly determined by at least some balance sheet items (Hannan and
Hanweck, 1988; James, 1988; Keeley, 1990). Pointing out that theory predicts a
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non-linear relation between risk premia on debt and balance-sheet measures of
risk, Gorton and Santomero (1990) derive implied asset volatilities from sub-debt
spreads, and regress them on accounting indicators (using the same dataset as
Avery et al., 1988), but do not find evidence in support of the market-monitoring
hypothesis. Brewer and Mondschean (1994), on the other hand, find evidence
that the quality of banks’ assets is reflected in both CD rates and in stock return
volatilities.
Several later studies report relatively consistent evidence in support of market
monitoring by sub-debt holders, using credit ratings, or ratings changes, as
benchmark risk measures (Jagtiani et al., 2002; Sironi, 2002, 2003; Pop, 2006).
Hall et al. (2001) and Krishnan et al. (2006), on the other hand, are unable to
produce evidence of ratings being reflected in various equity-based risk measures
or in bond spreads, respectively. Event studies on announcement effects of ratings
changes further complicate the picture: Berger and Davies (1998) find no
announcement effects on abnormal stock returns, whereas Gropp and Richards
(2001) find significant effects on stock returns but not on bond returns.
Considerations regarding the underlying conditions for market discipline often
explicitly or implicitly factor into the research design of a large part of this liter-
ature (as previously noted). The ‘no-bailout’ condition, for example, is addressed
by a number of papers. Thus, the conjectural government guarantees possibly
associated with banks being ‘too big to fail’ are considered by Ellis and Flannery
(1992) and Morgan and Stiroh (2001). Both papers find evidence of a ‘too-big-
to-fail’ effect. Accounting for possible differences in the extent of implicitly issued
guarantees under different regulatory regimes, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and
Hall et al. (2004) reach different results: whereas Flannery and Sorescu find that
a more credible commitment to a no-bailout policy on the part of the deposit
insurer leads to higher sensitivity of sub-debt yield spreads to underlying credit
risk, Hall et al. find no such effect. The condition that markets must have good
information about the borrower is also addressed by Morgan and Stiroh (2001).
Their findings indicate that the market is tougher on more opaque banks, in terms
of the sensitivity of sub-debt spreads to variations in asset quality.
A number of studies address various methodological problems associated with
the standard risk-sensitivity approach to testing market monitoring3. At the focus
3 The issue of non-linearity between bond spreads and standard accounting-based risk indicators, as addressed
by Gorton and Santomero (1990), has already been mentioned. This and other potential specification errors
inherent in the standard risk-sensitivity approach, including possible omitted-variables problems, are addressed
by Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Pennachi (2001). Other contributions, for instance Covitz et al. (2004) and
Goyal (2005), argue that the association between spreads on risky debt and standard benchmark risk measures
may be underestimated unless it is taken into account that riskier banks may avoid issuing sub-debt in the first
place (in order to avoid being disciplined), or that they may be forced to accept a higher number of restrictive
covenants being included in the debt contracts. Covitz et al. (2004) find limited evidence in support of the
former hypothesis, whereas Goyal (2005) finds that risk significantly determines covenants included in sub-debt
issues.
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of interest for the remainder of this paper is the unobservability problem
described in the introduction4. The problem is this: If the existing benchmark risk
indicators against which the market-based measure is tested are a priori ‘better’
measures, what is the point of having supervisors paying more attention to the
market and imposing indirect market discipline by using market indicators as
triggers for prompt corrective action, etc.? On the other hand, if the benchmark
indicators are unsatisfactory gauges of risk, what can possibly be learnt from a
test where ‘success’ is defined in terms of a close association between the tested
market indicator and the unsatisfactory benchmark measures? Presumably, if
markets can track risk as well as accounting ratios or rating agencies do, they
might also be able to do it better. If so, failure to uncover any significant relation
between the market-based and the benchmark measures is consistent both with
the hypothesis that market prices incorporate more information and with the
hypothesis that they incorporate less information than the benchmark indicators.
Event-study-type tests suffer from a similar type of problem, as illustrated by the
results of Gropp and Richards (2001), for example.
As should be evident from the brief literature review above, improvements of
risk-sensitivity tests have often consisted in controlling for factors thought to
influence the extent to which markets can be expected to monitor risk. This
reflects a de facto recognition that market discipline is conditioned on a number
of parameters, such as the institutional setting. However, simply controlling for
these factors does not remedy the unobservability problem. In the following sec-
tion, I outline a method which makes use of the fact that the informativeness of
market-based risk indicators is dependent on the conditions for market discipline,
as laid out in Section 2.1., whereas typical benchmark measures are not (or at
least less so). Although the informativeness of different measures cannot be
directly observed, observations on the institutional setting can provide a point of
reference for inferring the relative informativeness of different risk indicators.
3. METHOD AND HYPOTHESES
3.1. Basic setup and hypotheses
Suppose a bank’s ‘true’ risk equals the probability of default P, which is unob-
served. There are two types of proxies of P: a market-based indicator, M (e.g.
spreads on risky bonds), and a benchmark indicator, B (e.g. accounting informa-
4 I have not seen this problem explicitly addressed in any of the empirical literature, although the problem is
implicit in, e.g., Evanoff and Wall (2001) and Gropp and Richards (2001); already Gorton and Santomero
(1990) recognize that the validity of this type of tests is conditional on the auxiliary hypothesis that the inde-
pendent variables are accurate proxies of true risk; a similar criticism against the approach is raised in Saunders
(2001).
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tion). A standard ‘risk-sensitivity’ regression of the market-based risk indicator
takes the (simplified) form
,( 1 )
where w is a random error term. The variance of the error term,  , measures
how well M proxies B: a small   would suggest that M is a good proxy of
B; conversely, a large   would suggest the opposite. It can be shown (see
Appendix A) that   can be expressed as a function of two other error vari-
ances,   and  , which measure, respectively, how accurately M and B
proxy P. However,   and   are only ‘hypothetical’: since we cannot
observe P, we cannot actually measure how well M and B proxy it.
One way to describe the unobservability problem is in terms of the contributions
of   and   to  . We can run the risk-sensitivity regression and
observe   (or, strictly speaking, we observe  ), but it is not possible to
determine the relative contributions of its components. If   is ‘large’, (i.e.,
if there is little association between M and B), it could be the consequence both
of a large   and of a large  . Rejecting the market monitoring hypoth-
esis based on a weak association between M and B effectively entails a presump-
tion that   is larger than   (i.e. that B is more informative of P than M
is). In fact, we have no way of knowing that this is the case. M could be a poor
proxy of B either because it is a less informative proxy of P, or because it is more
informative.
Now assume that the informativeness of the market-based indicator depends pos-
itively on the extent to which the conditions for market discipline are satisfied, as
measured by some variable  , whereas the benchmark indicator is invariant
to these conditions5. In other words, more liquid financial markets, better infor-
mation, lower bailout probability, etc., will result in a smaller  , but will not
affect .
Suppose further that from a regression of the type represented by equation (1)
over a large sample for which there is ‘sufficient’ variation in  , we retrieve
the individual  ’s. I will call this a measure of the divergence between M and B.
In line with the above argument,   could be large either because   is less
informative of   than   is, or because it is more informative. But we know that
the informativeness of M is increasing in   (whereas B is invariant to  ).
Now matching each   against the corresponding observation on MD condi-
tions,  , it would make intuitive sense to suggest, for example, that if large
’s were observed when conditions for market discipline are poorly satisfied
5 I will henceforth refer to these conditions as ‘conditions for market discipline’, ‘MD conditions’, or sometimes
more loosely as ‘institutional quality’. The assumption that market-based risk indicators are sensitive to these
conditions, whereas common benchmark indicators are not, is qualified and discussed more in detail in subsec-
tion 3.2.





var u () var v ()
var u () var v ()
var u () var v () var w ()
var w () w ˆ 2
var w ()
var u () var v ()
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(  is ‘small’), it is more likely to be because   is less informative of   than
. In fact, it is possible to infer more than that. Suppose that over the entire
sample we observe that   consistently decreases as   increases. Such an
observation is only consistent with M being an ‘initially’ less informative indica-
tor of P; as   increases,   decreases, thereby also decreasing   – the
‘divergence’ between M and B. Conversely, if   consistently increases in ,
then that would suggest that M becomes a poorer and poorer indicator of B – not
because it becomes less informative about P (since we know that its informative-
ness increases in  ), but because it becomes increasingly more informative
than B about P6. A third possible scenario, of course, is that no significant asso-
ciation is found between   and  . This is most likely to occur if M and B are
closely associated, and the errors from the risk-sensitivity regression are small and
truly random.
This discussion suggests a two-step methodology, where the overall objective is
to infer the difference in informativeness between some market-based and some
benchmark indicators of bank risk. The steps are:
1) run a standard risk-sensitivity regression of a market-based risk indicator M
on one or several benchmark indicators B. Retrieve the residuals  , and use
them (squared) as a measure of the ‘divergence’ between M and B;
2) run a regression of   against some proxy of  , and infer the relative
informativeness of M and B from the sign of the slope coefficient.
For the second stage regression, the following hypotheses can be formulated with
regard to the slope coefficient:
H1. if the market-based indicator M is on average less informative about the true
probability of default than the benchmark indicators B, the divergence
between M and B (defined as  ) will be a decreasing function of MD con-
ditions (the slope coefficient on   will be negative). This will be more
likely in an institutional setting where the conditions for market discipline
are poorly satisfied;
H2. if M is on average more informative than B about the true probability of
default, the divergence between M and B will be an increasing function of
MD conditions (the slope coefficient on   will be positive). This will be
more likely for an institutional setting where the conditions for market dis-
cipline are well satisfied;
H3. if the market-based indicator M is on average equally informative as the
benchmark indicators B, the divergence between M and B will be a zero-
slope function of the conditions for market discipline (the slope coefficient
6 Technically, the increase in   is then driven by a decrease in the covariance between u and v, which enters
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on   will be small and insignificant). This will (possibly) be more likely
in an average-quality institutional setting.
In practice, it is likely that for a large enough sample (sufficient variation in insti-
tutional conditions), the relationship between   and   may not be monot-
onic. In particular, if institutional conditions are bad enough, market prices will
not reflect risk as well as other, less ‘institution-sensitive’ measures do, implying
a relatively large divergence; as institutional conditions improve, the gap in
informativeness successively closes; ultimately, when institutional conditions are
good enough, market prices may increasingly incorporate more information than
the benchmark measures, implying that divergence again starts to increase.
Therefore, if the benchmark measures are more informative for adverse institu-
tional conditions, but market-based measures are more informative for benevo-
lent institutional conditions, then a non-linear (U-shaped) function should be
expected.
To round off this subsection, it is useful to consider more explicitly what testing
these hypotheses might actually tell us. First, testing these hypotheses for a sample
with a wide enough distribution in MD conditions, the test may inform as to
whether market-based risk measures are more informative for some (high) ranges
of institutional quality, or, conversely, whether non-market risk measures are
more informative for some (low) ranges of institutional quality. By so doing, the
test provides a point of reference for assessing the outcome of risk-sensitivity tests
of market-based risk indicators in light of the unobservability problem. Second,
insofar as the test is devised in a way which allows repeating it for different
market-based risk measures and comparing the results, it may inform on the rel-
ative informativeness of equity-based risk measures and risk measures based on
uninsured debt. Third, the test informs on the relative sensitivity of different
market-based measures to MD conditions. These two last issues can contribute
to a better understanding of the relative merits of shareholder vs. creditor disci-
pline (for a given institutional setting). All these three aspects contribute to under-
standing the viability of market discipline in general, and may help to answer
questions such as, for example: Is a sub-debt policy a viable alternative to share-
holder discipline? Could market discipline (whether by shareholders or creditors)
be relied on as a complementary supervisory mechanism even in environments
where institutional conditions are relatively poor? 
3.2. Discussion
At this point, a few comments on the main assumptions of the methodology
described in this section may be warranted. In what follows, I address three key
assumptions, point out potential weaknesses, and provide further motivation.
CMD
w ˆ 2 CMD
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The first discussion relates to the assumption that the benchmark risk measures
are invariant to the conditions for market discipline. In theory, these conditions
can easily be ‘isolated’ and defined as distinct vis-à-vis any factors conditioning
the informativeness of the benchmark risk measures; in practice, however, the
assumption is unlikely to fully hold. To illustrate with an obvious example, the
availability of ‘good information’ should affect the informativeness of market-
based risk measures, but is conceivably also strongly correlated with disclosure
quality, and therefore with the informativeness of accounting-based benchmark
measures. A similar argument could possibly be advanced for other dimensions
of MD conditions: factors related to overall financial-system transparency and
institutional integrity are likely to positively influence the informativeness of both
market-based and benchmark measures of risk.
However, a sufficient condition for the methodology to still be valid is that the
market-based measures are more responsive to overall MD conditions than the
benchmark measures. This is the softer version of the assumption that I effectively
rely on in the empirical implementation of the methodology, and it can be moti-
vated by again considering each of the four conditions for market discipline, and
their likely impact on the informativeness of market prices on the one hand, and
accounting variables on the other7.
(i) open capital markets: This condition relates to general financial-market effi-
ciency, liquidity, absence of price-distorting restrictions, etc. Almost by def-
inition, it should influence the accuracy of market prices more than the
informativeness of accounting variables. It could have an effect on account-
ing variables as well if financial market development increases the demand
for information, and this demand positively affects the quality of financial
statements, but if so, the effect is indirect;
(ii) markets’ access to good information could, in principle, refer to information
from any source, but provided financial statements are an important source
of information for financial markets8, it is clear that – as indicated above –
this particular condition for market discipline also measures the informa-
tiveness of accounting variables;
(iii) no prospects of bailout: this condition directly affects the incentives of an
investor to incorporate risk in the price of a financial claim, but it is difficult
to see how it should be in any way correlated with disclosure quality;
7 I focus on accounting variables as benchmark indicators here, since that is what I will use in the empirical part
of the paper. It is not certain that all arguments are equally applicable to all conceivable kinds of benchmark
indicators (e.g. credit ratings).
8 Yu (2005) finds that accounting transparency significantly affects spreads on corporate bonds – i.e., that bond
holders charge an ‘opacity premium’; this result would imply that financial statements are an important source
of information for investors, and – more indirectly – that the informativeness of (debt) market-based risk indi-
cators and that of accounting-based benchmark indicators are correlated. See also Morgan and Stiroh (2001)
for results on the effect of opacity on the risk sensitivity of banks’ sub-debt spreads.
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(iv) responsiveness to market signals: this condition directly measures the ‘influ-
ence’ aspect of market discipline, and could therefore be a determinant of
the amount of monitoring effort investors are prepared to expend. Again, it
is difficult to see how it should be associated with the informativeness of
accounting variables (other than, possibly, via an indirect mechanism
related to the information condition [ii]: investors’ ability to enforce their
interests depends to some extent on the quality of corporate governance,
which is in turn associated with the availability of good information).
These considerations seem to suggest that the validity of the assumption that mar-
ket-based risk indicators are more sensitive to the conditions for market discipline
hinges on finding a proxy for these conditions that does not primarily measure
condition (ii), but which factors in all four dimensions (or, indeed, focuses on one
or all three of the other conditions).
The second assumption up for discussion relates to the possible specification
errors in linear risk-sensitivity tests of market-based risk indicators (as mentioned
briefly earlier on in the paper). The assumption is that these errors are small and
unimportant. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) provide a good overview of possible
specification problems for linear bond-spread regressions, but also conclude that
the problem of non-linearity is probably small in practice. I effectively rely on this
conclusion when specifying the first-stage regressions linearly. The risk I run is
that the residuals from these regressions capture a non-linear relationship rather
than (or in addition to) differences in informativeness. It is not likely, however,
that this would systematically affect the results in the stage-2 regressions. If it
does not bias the stage-2 results in any particular direction (which appears diffi-
cult to argue), it would simply appear as additional noise which renders estimates
somewhat less precise.
A third assumption lies in that the hypotheses developed, and interpretation of
the second-stage regression results along the lines I have suggested, presume that
the market-based indicator and the benchmark indicators are ex ante expected to
measure more or less the same thing. It is of course possible that as the conditions
for market-based indicators to be informative improve, the divergence between
those indicators and the benchmarks could increase because they reflect different
information better (rather than more or less information about the same under-
lying ‘true’ variable). On the margin, this will probably be the case, to some
extent, but I will assume that the effect is not powerful enough to ‘crowd out’ the
effect of differences in informativeness of true risk9.
9 Assuming anything else would, in fact, imply that most of the empirical literature on market discipline is
misspecified from beginning to end.
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4. ESTIMATION AND DATA
4.1. Estimation
4.1.1. First-stage regressions
I extract the ‘divergence’ between three different market-based risk indicators
(sub-debt spreads, stock return volatility, and a market version of the so-called
Z-score), and a set of benchmark indicators (based on accounting data), for a
large panel of banks (see subsection 4.2 for details) by running standard risk-
sensitivity regressions. Including period fixed effects in the specification, the risk-
sensitivity regression can be reformulated as:
β +  γ +  , (2)
where m is a market-based indicator of bank risk, b a vector of benchmark risk
indicators, and z is a vector of control variables10. The  ’s represent separate
intercepts for each time period between period 1 and period T. This model is
estimated by panel least squares on the different market-based risk indicators,
and the squared standardized residuals from these regressions are used as meas-
ures of the divergence between m and b. There is thus one divergence measure
corresponding to each market-based risk measure tested.
4.1.2. Second-stage regressions
The second step consists in running regressions of the divergence measures
obtained in step 1 on a proxy for MD conditions. As the primary proxy I use the
first principal component of a large number of institutional features (again, see
subsection 4.2 for details), denoted PC1. In practice, it is not possible to know a
priori whether the relationship between the divergence measure and the proxy for
MD conditions is monotonic or not. Conceivably, for a dataset where the disper-
sion of observations on the independent variable is sufficiently wide, it would not
be – unless, of course, market-based risk measures are not more informative than
the benchmark measures for any levels of institutional quality actually observed
(or, conversely – but perhaps less likely – if market-based risk measures are always
more informative). Given that a major objective of the paper is to explore this
very question – whether market-based risk measures are sometimes ‘better’ – and
given the heterogeneity of the dataset at hand, it is clearly warranted to at least
open up for the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship. In order to cover for
all eventualities, I will test three different specifications. The first is a simple bivar-
iate linear regression:
10 See Appendix B for a more formalized description of the estimations, including some technical considerations
regarding the use of fixed effects.
mit α0 α1D2i …α T 1 – DTi bit ++ + + = zit wit
αk
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(3)
where   is the squared standardized residual for the i’th bank at time t, obtained
from a regression of equation (2) on one of the considered market-based risk
measures,   is the corresponding observation on the first principal compo-
nent of MD conditions, and   is a random error. The second specification is a
non-linear version of equation (3):
(4)
with notation and variable definitions as above. In some regressions, I will add
control variables to the two basic specifications above. Finally, I will run piece-
wise linear regressions according to the following specification:
(5)
where the Dj’s are dummy variables taking on unit value for the first, second,
third and fourth quartiles, respectively, of the observations on PC1, and zero for
all other ranges of PC1.
The expectations on the coefficient signs, in line with the hypotheses advanced in
subsection 3.1, are as follows. For equation (3),   will be positive if, on average
over the entire sample, the market-based risk measure corresponding to the diver-
gence measure used as dependent variable in the regression is more informative
than the benchmark measures (the b’s) from equation (2). Conversely,   will be
negative if the benchmark risk measures are more informative on average for the
present sample. The final possibility is that   is insignificantly different from
zero, which could have two reasons: first, market and non-market measures may
be about equally informative regardless of MD conditions; second, the linear
specification is inadequate because the slope coefficient depends on the value of
PC1 (and positive and negative slopes are more or less symmetrically distributed
over PC1).
For equation (4), the basic expectation is a convex relationship, implying that 
should be positive, regardless of whether the slope is positive or negative on aver-
age. If the relationship is U-shaped, or if a negative effect of mostly inferior mar-
ket-based measures dominates, then   should be negative. The perhaps more
far-fetched possibility that market-based risk measures are always superior – and
increasingly so over the entire range of observations on MD conditions – would
imply a positive  .
Finally, the  ’s from equation (5) can be interpreted in analogy with the   in
equation (3), except now the interpretation is valid only for the sub-sample of
PC1 corresponding to the   in question. A negative coefficient value would be
most expected for  , and a positive value most expected for  .
w ˆ
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Equations (3)-(5) are estimated as before by panel OLS, but now without either
cross-section or period fixed effects (again, see Appendix B for details).
4.2. Data
The empirical methodology described in the previous section is applied to a panel
dataset comprising several hundred banks worldwide. The banks are publicly
traded banks with annual financial statement data available in the BankScope
database between 1994 and 2005. As data availability varies considerably for
different bank-level variables, the exact number of banks covered depends on the
combination of variables used in a particular regression specification, but cover-
age is typically around 300 banks. The bank-specific data is supplemented by
country-specific data characterizing various aspects of the institutional setting in
the banks’ countries of origin (47 countries in all). Appendix C (Tables C1 – C3)
provides more detailed information about the sample (in terms of banks, coun-
tries, and years covered), and lists all variables used at different stages in the
analysis, with brief definitions and sources. In what follows, I describe these var-
iables, explain some of them in more detail, and provide summary statistics.
4.2.1. Market-based risk measures
I use three market-based risk measures, which were chosen on the basis that they
were the most frequently used in the literature and/or represented different cate-
gories of risk measures (a comprehensive overview of different bank risk meas-
ures used in previous literature – whether market-based, accounting-based, or
ratings-based – is given in Table D1 in Appendix D).
The first market-based risk measure is the spread over the risk-free interest rate
on subordinated notes or bonds. Spreads on sub-debt, or other types of formally
uninsured bank debt, have been widely subjected to risk-sensitivity tests of the
type represented by equation (2), especially for US data (see the literature review).
The spreads used here were observed at year-end and were collected directly from
Datastream and Reuters, with comparable risk-free rates subtracted from the
sub-debt yields at source. They are mostly secondary-market spreads, but in some
cases primary-market spreads were used, depending on availability. A large por-
tion of the banks included did not have any subordinated debt outstanding during
the sample period; consequently, subordinated-debt spreads were completely
unavailable for these banks. Spreads were also unavailable for a portion of the
banks that did have subordinated debt outstanding (according to the balance
sheet). As shown in Table 1, the total number of observations on subordinated
debt spreads was 637 – considerably less than for the other risk measures. In
addition, because accounting data (and consequently benchmark risk measures)
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are often missing for the early part of the sample period (1994-97) and missing
values for sub-debt spreads and accounting variables only partially overlap,
about 300 of these observations are lost for the risk-sensitivity regressions.
The second measure is the volatility of total equity returns, which is one of the
most widely used equity-based risk measures in the literature11. The return vola-
tility is the annualized standard deviation of daily equity returns, calculated sep-
arately for each year. Daily stock market prices for the included banks were col-
lected from Datastream.
The third market-based measure is a market version of the so-called Z-score,
which is essentially a simplified ‘distance to default’. The Z-score is originally
defined on accounting variables as
(6)
where   and   are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of bank i’s
return on assets, and   is the average share of capital to total assets over the
period t. The ‘market version’ Z-score is calculated using the return on equity and
the standard deviation of equity returns. It can be regarded as a combination
measure (rather than as a ‘pure’ market-based measure), since it incorporates
both accounting data and stock market data. The Z-score is negatively related to
the probability of default (and I therefore use it in the negative as dependent
variable for simplicity of comparison)12.
Summary statistics for the three market-based risk measures appear in Table 1
(panel A). The two equity-based risk measures were divided between bank/year
observations where the bank had sub-debt outstanding13 and observations where
it did not, and tested non-parametrically for significant differences in distribu-
tion. The purpose of these tests was to provide an initial indication of whether
riskier banks are less likely to rely on uninsured debt for financing (as suggested
by Covitz et al., 2004), resulting in possible selection bias in risk-sensitivity tests
on sub-debt spreads. The results of the tests indicate that there are indeed signif-
icant differences in risk between the two groups, although the differences are
small. Moreover, the direction of the difference depends on the risk measure used:
the stock return volatility measure indicates that banks with sub-debt outstanding
are less risky, whereas the Z-score suggests the opposite. These results remain
11 A theoretically ‘better’ alternative would possibly have been to use the volatility of abnormal equity returns,
based on some version of the market model or CAPM. I ran several versions of one- and two-factor market
models (using Datastream’s global general and bank stock price indices), and found that the volatilities of the
resulting abnormal returns are correlated with total stock return volatility by a coefficient typically larger than
0.90. I conclude that using one or the other matters little.
12 The Z-score is widely used as a risk measure in the banking literature, see, e.g., Hannan and Hanweck (1988),
Boyd et al. (1993), Beck and Laeven (2006); the market-based version is used by, e.g., Crouzille et al. (2004).
13 Either because the balance sheet reported a non-zero amount of outstanding subordinated debt, or because sub-
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when instead applying a t-test to the sub-sample means (not reported). A possible
explanation is of course that other factors need to be controlled for; for example,
if larger banks are both more likely to issue subordinated debt and more likely to
enjoy conjectural government guarantees, then the ‘true’ relationship between
risk and sub-debt issuance likelihood may be obscured in a simple sub-sample
comparison.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, market-based and accounting-based risk measures
The table reports summary statistics for the included market-based (Panel A) and benchmark/accounting-based
(Panel B) risk measures. Summary statistics for the included measures (except sub-debt spreads) are reported
separately for bank/year observations with subordinated debt outstanding (sub outst.) and those without (no sub
outst.), as well as for the full sample of observations (all). The ‘Test’ column reports the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney
rank-based test statistic for the null hypothesis that the ‘sub outst.’ and the ‘no sub outst.’ groups have equal
distributions around the median.
*** Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of equal medians at the 0.01 level.
4.2.2. Benchmark risk indicators and control variables
The benchmark risk measures used in this paper – as in most of the related liter-
ature – are various standard accounting ratios believed to be correlated with the
bank’s overall risk. A wide range of accounting-based measures have been used,
as indicated by Table D1. The categorization of these various measures and the
exact choice of variables to be included in the regressions are to some extent a
Panel A: Market-based risk measures
Group Mean Std dev Median Test Min Max Obs
Sub-debt spread (bp’s) All 115 208 81.0 -370 988 637
Stock return volatility All 0.0228 0.0171 0.0191 0.000 0.202 4964
Sub outst. 0.0184 1556
No sub outst. 0.0196 3.42*** 3408
Market Z-score All 5.35 5.28 3.55 0.350 40.3 2688
Sub outst. 3.20 1318
No sub outst. 3.94 8.40*** 1370
Panel B. Accounting-based risk measures
Group Mean Std dev Median Test Min Max Obs
Leverage All 0.914 0.055 0.931 0.462 0.990 3322
Sub outst. 0.942 1510
No sub outst. 0.914 20.0*** 1812
Non-performing loans / equity All 0.666 0.726 0.458 0.000 4.89 2534
Sub outst. 0.505 1241
No sub outst. 0.404 4.74*** 1293
Liquid assets / total assets All 0.253 0.189 0.214 0.000 0.974 3388
Sub outst. 0.181 1523
No sub outst. 0.257 8.31*** 1865
ROA All 0.0081 0.0159 0.0077 0.0944 0.0708 3315
Sub outst. 0.0064 1501
No sub outst. 0.0090 7.32*** 1814
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matter of discretion. The vast majority of studies use some measure of leverage,
or capitalization. Similarly, different measures of asset structure and/or asset
quality are typically included – particularly proxies related to the quality of
extended loans and to the ease with which the bank can absorb temporary losses
(such as different liquidity measures). Finally, it is common to control for profit-
ability. Based on these conventions, I include leverage (defined as one minus the
ratio of equity to total assets), loan quality, (the ratio of non-performing loans to
equity), liquidity (liquid assets over total assets), and the return on assets (ROA
– defined as net earnings divided by total assets)14.
All these accounting-based benchmark measures are calculated from annual bal-
ance sheet and income statement data as reported in BankScope. Descriptive sta-
tistics are reported in panel B of Table 1. Again, the sample is divided into sub-
samples based on whether the bank had subordinated debt outstanding or not.
The table reinforces the impression given by the Z-score in the previous table that
banks without any outstanding sub-debt are, in fact, less risky than other banks.
Banks without outstanding sub-debt have significantly lower leverage, lower
share of non-performing loans, higher share of liquid assets, and are significantly
more profitable than other banks. Again, the conclusion would be that in a het-
erogeneous sample such as this one, any tendency for riskier banks to be discour-
aged to issue uninsured debt (if it exists) is obscured by other factors which are
more important determinants of sub-debt issuance. Such factors could be related
to the size and main line of business of the bank, financial development and other
local market conditions, etc. For example, sub-debt issuance is more likely by
larger banks, which may benefit from conjectural ‘too-big-to-fail’ guarantees, and
are therefore more risk prone. Another possibility is that subordinated debt is
more likely to be issued by banks originating in financial systems that are more
developed, less regulated, and more competitive, which could in turn indicate a
weaker risk-reducing effect of charter values and lower profitability for these
banks (see, e.g., Keeley, 1990; see Boyd and Nicoló, 2005, for an alternative
view).
The choice of which control variables to include in the first-stage regressions is a
delicate balance, since I want to lose as little information as possible related to the
conditions for market discipline, while at the same time controlling for factors
unrelated to these conditions. Many of the strongest candidate control variables
– such as bank size, ownership structure, home country income level, deposit
insurance coverage, etc. (not to mention country dummy variables) – are conceiv-
ably strongly correlated with MD conditions. After much deliberation, and
loosely following the few previous cross-country studies that exist (see for
14 Cf., e.g., Sironi’s (2003) division into a leverage, a profitability, an asset quality, and a liquidity component of
bank risk.
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instance Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010), I include three bank-level and four
country-level control variables. At the bank level, I include the deposit share of
total assets, net interest margin, and the cost/income ratio15. These variables are
reasonable proxies for general bank characteristics without being too strongly
correlated with the extent to which market discipline can be imposed. Moreover,
they are fairly orthogonal in variation (a pairwise correlation matrix for the first-
stage bank-level variables is shown in Appendix C, Table C4). The source for
these, as for previous financial-statement variables, is BankScope. Sub-debt
spreads are also controlled for time to maturity (in years) and the size of the issue
(the natural logarithm of the issue amount in million USD), in accordance with
most previous studies on subordinated debt spreads. This information was col-
lected together with the spreads from the same sources (i.e., Reuters and Datast-
ream).
Table 2. Descriptive statistics, control variables included in first-stage regressions
The table reports summary statistics for the included bank-level and country-level control variables included in
the regressions of market-based risk measures on benchmark risk measures.
At the country level, control variables for general macroeconomic conditions are
included in the form of the real interest rate, the inflation rate, and real GDP
growth – all from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. To control
for the possibility that a systemic financial crisis (such as the Asian financial crisis
in 1997-98 or the Argentinean bank crisis in 2001) has an independent effect on
the extent to which different risk measures diverge, I include a crisis dummy. The
15 The one control variable that is included in almost all previous studies on bank risk is the size of the bank
(typically measured as the log of total assets). Most of my deliberations revolved around whether to include this
variable or not in the first-stage regressions. Absolute bank size would be correlated with the extent to which
market discipline can be imposed insofar as it proxies for the existence of conjectural ‘too-big-to-fail’ guaran-
tees, and for general liquidity of the bank’s stock and bonds. These aspects of MD conditions should obviously
be (and are) accounted for in the second-stage regressions. Therefore, because of the substantial risk that ‘bank
size’– in the absence of more direct proxies – would pick up a lot of these dimensions of MD conditions (with
the effect that much information is lost for the second stage of the analysis), I decided in the end not to include
bank size as a control variable.
Mean Std dev Min Max Obs
Bank-level control variables
Deposits 0.82 0.12 0.16 0.95 2878
Net interest margin 0.040 0.051 -0.63 0.48 3363
Cost/income ratio 0.65 0.34 0.077 8.59 3318
Country-level control variables
(annual obs’s for 47 countries)
Real interest rate 0.060 0.091 -0.91 0.78
Inflation 0.067 0.14 -0.039 1.55
Growth 0.033 0.031 -0.13 0.18
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source for identifying countries/years where there was a systemic crisis was
Honohan and Laeven (2005) and Laeven and Valencia (2008).
4.2.3. Proxies of the conditions for market discipline
As the primary measure of MD conditions I use the first principal component of
a set of bank- and country-level variables – each of which proxy for one dimen-
sion or other of the extent to which the conditions for market discipline are sat-
isfied. A relatively large number of bank-level and firm-level variables were used
to construct the composite measure. Variable definitions are summarized in Table
C3 (Panel B), with indicative categorizations according to which one of Lane’s
(1993) four conditions for market discipline that they primarily capture, as well
as brief descriptions where definitions are not obvious. Summary statistics are
reported in Table 3. The exact choice of variables contains an obvious discretion-
ary element, but because the data are reduced, the choice is a matter of trading
off tractability and comprehensiveness, rather than a matter of accuracy in cap-
turing any one specific condition for market discipline.
The data reduction itself has advantages and drawbacks. The motive for using
principal components analysis (and for focusing on the first principal component)
in this paper is essentially three-fold. First, for ease of interpretation, it is prefer-
able to focus on one proxy of CMD, which however by definition is a multi-dimen-
sional concept. Reducing the data makes it possible to capture several facets of
the concept in a single measure. Second, the technique implies ‘efficient’ use of the
variation in individual proxies of MD conditions, and avoidance of multicolline-
arity issues due to high correlation between (some of) these individual proxies.
Third, the variation in the individual variables used to proxy CMD occurs at the
bank-level for some variables, at the country level for others; combining them
eliminates the need to deal with potential interpretation and error-correction
problems associated with this partial ‘clustering’ of the data. A potential draw-
back with the method is that one potentially loses sight of the contribution of
specific dimensions of MD conditions, or specific market-discipline conditions16.
A related problem is caused by the fact that the principal components are orthog-
onal to one another. This makes it increasingly difficult to interpret the (succes-
sively less important) higher-order components in terms of what they have to say
about the overall conditions for market discipline.
16 Suppose, for instance, we are particularly interested in analyzing the extent to which deposit insurance coverage
contributes to making spreads on subordinated bonds a more or less informative measure of bank risk. Insofar
as the proxy for deposit insurance coverage is decomposed according to its (partial) covariation with other
measures of MD conditions, and the principal components are aggregations of different measures, this contri-
bution may be difficult to assess.
SUERF2011_4.book  Page 23  Friday, December 2, 2011  1:54 PM24 DIVERGENCE OF RISK INDICATORS AND THE CONDITIONS FOR MARKET DISCIPLINE IN BANKING
larcier
Below follows a description by category of the variables that went into the prin-
cipal components analysis.
(i) open capital markets: This condition for market discipline is primarily cap-
tured by a proxy of the liquidity of the bank’s securities (the average daily
turnover rate of the bank’s stock), and various standard measures of finan-
cial development at country level. I used four measures suggested by Rajan
and Zingales (2003) – total bank deposits (or M2, as available) over GDP,
stock market capitalization over GDP, net equity issues over gross fixed cap-
ital formation, and the number of firms with stock traded on public
exchanges per million of population; in addition, I used private sector credit
over GDP (as suggested by La Porta et al., 1997), and private sector bond
market capitalization as a share of GDP. Sources for these variables were
IMF International Financial Statistics or the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators (GDP, investment, bank deposits, and credit); Eurostat
(stock market capitalization for most European countries) or Datastream
(all other stock market data); and the Bank for International Settlements
(bond market capitalization). Net equity issues were proxied as the
year-on-year change in stock market capitalization, corrected for the change
in stock prices as measured by Datastream’s overall market price index for
each country. Net issues were calculated for each of the years 1994-2005,
and then averaged. To capture the international dimension of capital market
openness, finally, I used an index of foreign-investment openness, based on
the presence of restrictions on capital-account transactions as reported in
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions, and taken from Brune et al. (2001);
(ii) quality of information: The availability of bank-specific information is
proxied by a single country-level index variable. The variable equals
CIFAR’s index of overall financial-reporting transparency (see Bushman et
al., 2004) for all countries where this index is available, and Barth et al.’s
(2001, 2006) private monitoring index (recalculated to the CIFAR scale) for
all other countries17;
(iii) no prospects of being bailed out: The probability that claimants on the bank
will be bailed out depends primarily on explicit and implicit deposit insur-
ance coverage. As a proxy for the share of formally insured debt (at the bank
level), I use country-level data on the fraction of deposit value covered by
explicit deposit insurance (net of the coinsurance ratio; available from
17 It is clear that the focus on accounting transparency in this condition for market discipline makes it questionable
whether market-based risk measures are more responsive to the condition than the accounting-based bench-
mark measures. However, as argued in Section 3, a sufficient condition for the paper’s main hypotheses to hold
is that market-based measures are more responsive to the overall conditions for market discipline than the
benchmarks; if the market-based measure and the accounting-based measure are about equally responsive to
financial-statement transparency (as seems plausible), the inclusion of this variable neither adds nor subtracts
anything from the end results. Conceivable alternative measures of quality of information typically make use of
the market variables themselves (as in Morck et al., 2000, and Durnev et al., 2003, for instance).
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Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005), and multiply it by the ratio of deposits to total
debt for each bank and year. For countries where a specific coverage per-
centage is not available, I use 
as a proxy (also from Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005), and multiply by the ratio
of deposits to total debt for each bank and year, as previously. The share of
formally insured debt is always zero for countries/years with no explicit
deposit insurance scheme.
Implicit guarantees are proxied by a variable called ‘no-bailout credibility’
in Table C3. It equals the Fitch Support Rating (which is an index variable
showing the probability that a bank will be bailed out in case of default) for
banks where such a rating is available; for all other banks, I take one less the
bank’s share of total deposits in its country of origin and transform the
result to the Fitch scale. Balance-sheet data on deposits for each bank and
data on total deposits (or M2) in each country are from BankScope and
IMF’s International Financial Statistics, respectively, as before. Finally, I use
the Reuters ownership data (see under condition [iv], below) to construct a
government-ownership dummy, to account for the possibility that govern-
ment-owned banks may be more likely to be bailed out in the event of fail-
ure;
(iv) responsiveness to market signals: The last condition for market discipline is
summarized at the bank level by a number of corporate governance varia-
bles (in the absence of more direct proxies for responsiveness). Ownership
data were collected from Reuters. The Reuters database distinguishes
between ownership by three types of owner: insiders/stakeholders, institu-
tions, and mutual funds. It contains percentages of ownership by the differ-
ent categories and by individual shareholders within the three groups. Both
insider ownership and outsider ownership (as proxied by the ownership
share of institutional investors) were used. In addition, responsiveness to
market signals may depend on how well capitalized the bank is. To measure
this in a simple way, the minimum Tier-1 capital requirement (assumed to
be 50% of the home country’s total capital requirement, as reported by
Barth et al., 2001, 2006) is subtracted from each bank’s equity-to-assets
ratio; the result gives the proxy for ‘excess capital’. At the country level,
bank claimants’ possibilities to exert influence are proxied by the widely
used creditor and shareholder rights indices (originally from La Porta et al.,
1997, 1998; with additional country scores from Allen et al., 2006; Djankov
et al., 2007, 2008; and Pistor et al., 2000), and the International Country
Risk Guide’s index of legal system integrity.
min 1 coverage limit
deposits/capita
-------------------------------------- , ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ coinsurance ratio –
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics, conditions for market discipline
The table reports summary statistics for variables included in the composite measures of the extent to which the
conditions for market discipline are satisfied (open capital markets, good information, no prospects of bailout,
and responsiveness to market signals).
Table 4 reports a summary of the outcome of the principal components analysis
on all the variables described above. I have only included the first six principal
components in Table 4 (as well as in the stage-two regressions), as higher-order
components account for less than five percent each of the variation in the proxies
for MD conditions. The proportion of the total variance accounted for by each
of components 1-6 is shown in Panel A in the table. The first component – that
on which I mainly rely – explains about 28 percent of the variation. The first six
components together account for about 70 percent of the variation in the varia-
bles described previously in this sub-section.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the coefficients of the individual market discipline
conditions for principal components 1-6. It shows that the first principal compo-
nent, PC1, puts most weight on the indicators of financial system development,
but is also strongly positively correlated with the quality of information (the
transparency index), and general legal-system integrity (as proxied by the
rule-of-law index). The one dimension of MD conditions that is not well reflected
in PC1 is the no-bailout condition. This dimension is instead an important ele-
ment in the second principal component, PC2 – as indicated by the positive coef-
Mean Std dev Min Max Obs
Bank-level variables
Turnover rate 0.79 2.27 0.00 53.3 4564
Share of formally insured debt 0.53 0.35 0.00 0.99 2881
No-bailout credibility 3.56 1.45 1.00 5.00 5066
Institutional ownership 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.98 5377
Insider ownership 0.39 0.31 0.00 0.99 5377
Excess capital 0.044 0.055 -0.030 0.49 3322
Country-level variables (annual obs’s for 47 countries)
Bank deposits/GDP 0.67 0.36 0.10 2.55
Private-sector credit/GDP 0.84 0.63 0.072 2.60
Equity issues/Gross Fixed Capital Formation 0.18 0.13 0.021 0.63
Equity market capitalization/GDP 0.45 0.40 0.00 2.75
Number of publicly traded firms/mn. population 23.3 28.5 1.13 194
Corporate bond market capitalization/GDP 0.31 0.40 0.00 2.12
Foreign-investment openness 3.51 2.71 0.00 9.00
Corporate transparency/private monitoring index 67.2 8.74 32.7 85.0
Shareholder rights index 3.16 1.25 1.00 5.00
Creditor rights index 2.39 1.24 0.00 4.00
Index of rule of law 4.15 1.38 1.00 6.00
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ficient on ‘no-bailout credibility’ and the negative (though relatively small)
weights on the share of formally insured debt and government ownership. PC2
seems however to be negatively related to the responsiveness dimension of MD
conditions (as indicated by the positive coefficient on ‘excess capital’ and the neg-
ative one on the shareholder rights index). This illustrates the point made earlier
that higher-order principal components become increasingly more difficult to
interpret in terms of their overall impact on the conditions for market discipline.
This point is further reinforced by looking at coefficients for PC3-PC6. It is not
always clear whether the ‘net’ impact of these components on general MD condi-
tions is positive or negative. Due to this difficulty of interpretation, PC2-PC6 will
only be used as control variables in the regressions on the divergence measures to
check the stability of the estimates on the first principal component (rather than
as explanatory variables in their own right).
Table 4. Principal components analysis of conditions for market discipline, summary
Panel A reports eigenvalues and variance proportions of the first six principal components (of a total of 18
components) from a principal components analysis on the conditions for market discipline, based on the
correlation matrix of the included variables. PC1 refers to the first principal component, PC2 to the second, etc.
The bottom row in Panel A shows cumulative variance proportions. Panel B shows coefficients on the individual
proxies of the conditions for market discipline. The total number of included observations was 1862.
Panel A. Eigenvalues and variance proportions
P C 1P C 2P C 3P C 4P C 5P C 6
Eigenvalue 4.96 2.37 1.70 1.38 1.23 0.99
Variance proportion 0.275 0.131 0.095 0.077 0.068 0.055
Cumulative variance proportion 0.275 0.407 0.502 0.578 0.647 0.702
Panel B. Coefficients of individual proxies of MD conditions
P C 1P C 2P C 3P C 4P C 5P C 6
Open capital markets
Turnover rate -0.08 0.04 -0.21 0.07 -0.49 0.42
Bank deposits/GDP 0.29 -0.31 0.17 -0.04 0.04 0.35
Private-sector credit/GDP 0.33 0.02 0.36 0.01 0.01 0.16
Equity issues/Gross Fixed Capital Formation 0.24 -0.24 -0.27 -0.39 0.00 0.17
Equity market capitalization/GDP 0.38 -0.06 -0.03 -0.25 0.04 0.13
Number of publicly traded firms/mn. population 0.31 -0.15 -0.35 0.06 0.13 0.07
Corporate bond market capitalization/GDP 0.24 0.45 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.03
Foreign-investment openness 0.32 0.29 -0.05 -0.08 0.08 0.08
Good information
Corporate transparency/private monitoring index 0.33 0.08 -0.03 0.16 0.12 -0.11
No prospects of bailout
Share of formally insured debt -0.02 -0.07 0.64 -0.03 -0.28 0.23
No-bailout credibility -0.04 0.38 -0.11 -0.03 0.27 0.00
Government ownership -0.12 -0.19 -0.07 0.26 0.40 0.43




Table 5 reports the results of the first-stage regressions on all three market-based
indicators. Coefficient columns 1 and 2 report the results for two specifications
of the regressions on sub-debt spreads, where the only difference is that model (2)
includes a correction term for possible selection bias (which was constructed
because the summary statistics suggested a significant difference in risk distribu-
tion for the sub-sample of banks that had issued sub-debt vis-à-vis those banks
that had not). I followed Covitz et al. (2004), Birchler and Hancock (2004), and
Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004), and adopted the Heckman (1979) two-step
approach to selection-bias correction, where the correction term is the inverse
Mills ratio from a probit regression on a dummy variable indicating whether or
not a bank had issued sub-debt for each period. To preserve space, and because
they are of secondary interest for the main analysis, the specification and results
of this regression are reported in Appendix C (Table C6). As evident from Table
5, selection bias seems to be a minor issue here, and the inclusion of the correction
term does not affect the overall results. (I therefore use the squared standardized
residuals from model [1] as the sub-debt spread divergence measure in the sec-
ond-stage regressions.)
All benchmark risk measures except leverage significantly influence sub-debt
spreads, whereas the common control variables have little effect. In terms of coef-
ficient signs, the (negative) market Z-score responds in a similar way as the sub-
debt spread, whereas stock return volatility coefficients on both leverage and
ROA are negative (but indistinguishable from zero). Both equity-based measures
are much more sensitive to variation in the macroeconomy (except to real interest
rates).
In line with the implications of the unobservability problem and the fact that the
regressions deliberately leave out variables believed to influence the estimated
relationships, I do not want to draw too far-reaching conclusions from these first-
stage results. I just observe that they seem, overall, fully reconcilable with results
Responsiveness to market signals
Insider ownership -0.23 -0.07 0.01 -0.42 0.28 0.18
Institutional ownership 0.14 -0.13 -0.27 0.22 -0.51 -0.08
Excess capital -0.03 0.35 -0.26 -0.22 -0.18 0.23
Shareholder rights index 0.10 -0.42 -0.04 0.21 0.11 -0.30
Creditor rights index -0.14 0.07 -0.10 0.54 0.15 0.42
Index of rule of law 0.34 0.13 0.08 0.22 0.02 -0.08
SUERF2011_4.book  Page 28  Friday, December 2, 2011  1:54 PMDIVERGENCE OF RISK INDICATORS AND THE CONDITIONS FOR MARKET DISCIPLINE IN BANKING 29
larcier
reached in previous studies using similar approaches and specifications (e.g.,
Sironi, 2003, for a cross-country sample of sub-debt spreads, and Hall et al.,
2004, for various stock-market measures of risk, using US data).
Table 5. Results of regressions of market-based risk measures on accounting-based risk 
measures
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS regressions with period fixed effects. T-statistics in
parentheses are based on White type standard errors robust to time-varying residual variance and correlation
over time within cross-sections. In the regressions on sub-debt spreads, accounting variables and macroeconomic
variables are measured in percent (rather than fractions). Market Z-score is entered negatively in the regression
(it decreases in risk) for ease of comparability. Squared standardized residuals from regressions 1, 3, and 4 are
used as ‘divergence’ measures (for sub-debt, stock return volatility, and Z-score, respectively) in the subsequent
analysis.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence level.
Note: a) Correction for possible selection bias, based on the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure; the variable is the inverse Mills
ratio calculated from a probit selection regression, as specified in Table 6.
Dependent variable




Leverage 12.2 (1.08) 10.9 (0.96) -0.019 (-1.40) 48.9 (6.72)***
Non-performing loans 1.20 (2.03)** 1.21 (2.02)** 0.004 (5.27)*** 0.76 (3.64)***
Liquid assets 3.00 (1.91)* 3.01 (1.91)* 0.024 (5.97)*** 3.98 (4.66)***
Return on assets (ROA) 60.9 (2.19)** 63.8 (2.27)** -0.028 (-0.55) 4.08 (0.33)
Time to maturity -3.78 (-2.58)** -3.82 (-2.61)***
Amount of issue -15.3 (-0.73) -16.8 (-0.78)
Heckman ‘lambda’a -22.1 (-0.68)
Deposits 0.072 (0.054) 0.29 (0.22) -0.003 (-0.50) -0.91 (-0.73)
Net interest margin -3.54 (-0.32) -3.89 (-0.34) -0.051 (-3.22)*** -21.5 (-2.69)***
Cost/income ratio -0.15 (-0.098) -0.27 (-0.18) 0.001 (0.28) -0.86 (-1.50)
Real interest rate 2.14 (1.04) 2.15 (1.06) 0.013 (1.62) 5.75 (3.79)***
Inflation 15.7 (1.34) 15.3 (1.30) 0.047 (6.72)*** 12.4 (5.03)***
Growth 21.4 (1.87)* 19.14 (1.67)* 0.035 (2.71)*** 21.3 (5.08)***
Systemic financial crisis 38.5 (0.87) 35.8 (0.79) 0.004 (3.12)*** 1.56 (4.73)***
Period fixed effects (F-statistic) 5.18*** 5.28*** 9.32*** 4.80***
Adj. R2 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.33
Regression F 7.55*** 7.26*** 35.5*** 47.7***
No. of observations 267 264 1831 1781
No. of banks 97 96 349 347
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5.2. Second-stage regressions
5.2.1. Sub-debt spread divergence
Table 6 reports the stage-two results for sub-debt spread divergence (i.e., the
squared standardized residuals from the stage-one regressions on sub-debt
spreads). Five different specifications are estimated, all using different combina-
tions of the first six principal components of MD conditions as independent var-
iables. The first coefficient column shows sub-debt spread divergence regressed
on an intercept and the first principal component of MD conditions only. It indi-
cates a positive average relationship, but the right-hand-side variables are jointly
insignificant, as indicated by the regression F-statistic. Controlling for principal
components 2 through 6, the slope coefficient on the first component proves to
be negative on average for the whole sample (specification [2]).
Models (3) and (4) are specified to reflect the hypothesis of a possible non-mono-
tonic relationship between divergence and MD conditions. They allow for a sec-
ond-degree polynomial relationship between the divergence measure and the first
principal component of MD conditions – with or without controlling (linearly)
for components 2-6. These specifications – especially model (4) – seem to strongly
suggest a U-shaped relationship between divergence in information content and
institutional quality, very much in accordance with the hypotheses advanced. In
other words, as the institutional conditions for market discipline move from poor
to average, the divergence between sub-debt spreads and the accounting-based
risk measures becomes successively smaller (indicating that accounting-based
indicators are initially ‘better’ when conditions are poor); but as conditions con-
tinue to improve, divergence starts to increase again (suggesting that the inform-
ativeness of sub-debt spreads is higher than that of accounting variables when
conditions are good). The piecewise specification, finally, strongly supports the
results of the non-linear specifications. The slope on the independent variable is
significantly negative for the first two quartiles of PC1, zero for the third, and
significantly positive for the top quartile.
In line with what has been said earlier about the composition of higher-order
principal components, I have made no attempt to interpret the coefficients on
PC2-PC6 in specifications (2) and (4). They are entered only as a means to check
the stability of the estimates on PC1. Overall, these seem reasonably stable qual-
itatively, in the sense that they are consistent with a convex relationship between
sub-debt spread divergence and PC1, which is negative on average over the full
sample distribution of PC1, but turns positive toward the end of this distribution.
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Table 6. Results of regressions of sub-debt spread divergence on conditions for market 
discipline
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS regressions of the squared standardized residual from
model 1 in Table 5 on various combinations of the first six principal components of the conditions for market
discipline (PC1-PC6). Model 5 reports coefficient estimates from a piecewise linear regression on the first
principal component, where the distribution of the independent variable is split into four even quartiles.
T-statistics in parentheses are based on White standard errors robust to contemporaneous correlation and
cross-section heteroscedasticity.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence level.
Although the overall explanatory power is fairly low for these regressions (as
expected), these results would suggest that the unobservability problem cannot be
ignored in risk-sensitivity tests of sub-debt spreads in relatively mature markets
with limited implicit guarantees of formally uninsured bank liabilities. This result
seems to open up for an alternative interpretation of the ‘non-results’ of, e.g., Hall
et al. (2004), Covitz et al. (2004), and Krishnan et al. (2006). They all find, by
and large, that standard benchmark measures of banks’ default risk are not sig-
nificantly reflected in the spreads of risky debt, and interpret the results in terms
of a lack of risk-sensitivity on the part of the market-based measure. The point of
the unobservability problem is that this interpretation cannot be made, unless we
are certain that the benchmark indicator is always more informative (which, in
turn, disqualifies much of the idea with market discipline in the first place). The
results reported here on the relationship between sub-debt spread divergence and
12345
Intercept 0.88 (4.90)*** 0.74 (4.51)*** 0.36 (2.29)** 0.31 (2.11)** 0.37 (2.02)**
PC1 0.11 (4.60)*** -0.11 (-4.00)*** -0.005 (-0.17) -0.13 (-5.71)***
PC12 0.11 (24.5)*** 0.10 (10.9)***
PC2 -0.17 (-2.31)** -0.11 (-1.57)
PC3 -0.24 (-7.73)*** 0.043 (1.13)
PC4 0.080 (1.45) 0.13 (2.31)**
PC5 -0.42 (-3.35)*** -0.41 (-3.36)***
PC6 -0.17 (-1.98)** -0.21 (-2.03)**
PC1 – Q1 -0.25 (-3.55)***
PC1 – Q2 -0.38 (-3.83)***
PC1 – Q3 0.03 (0.31)
PC1 – Q4 0.43 (12.14)***
Adj. R2 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06
Regression F 2.40 3.71*** 8.87*** 4.36*** 4.66***
No. of 
observations
239 239 239 239 239
No. of banks 91 91 91 91 91
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the conditions for market discipline suggest that the lack of risk-sensitivity may
be on the part of the benchmark measures, rather than on sub-debt spreads.
5.2.2. Stock return volatility divergence
Table 7 shows the results of estimation of stock return volatility divergence as a
function of the principal components of MD conditions. Here, too, the results
support the supposition of an initially negative but convex function. The slope
coefficients on the first principal component are consistently negative. Allowing
for a non-linear relationship, the coefficient for the quadratic term turns out sig-
nificantly positive (but small). Controlling for successively less important princi-
pal components does little to boost explanatory power, and does not affect the
coefficients of PC1 and PC12.
Finally, the results of the piecewise specification, as reported in coefficient column
(5), support the results of the non-linear specifications (3) and (4) for all but the
bottom 25 percent of MD conditions. For quartiles 2-4, the coefficients on the
first principal component are all negative and significant, but decrease in magni-
tude as conditions for market discipline improve. For the top quartile, the coeffi-
cient is close to zero, indicating that the divergence between stock return volatility
and the accounting benchmark measures is relatively insensitive to improvements
in MD conditions for this sub-sample; however, the coefficient is still significantly
negative, so there is no basis for suggesting that stock-return volatility contain
more information on bank risk for higher levels of institutional development (as
was the case with sub-debt spreads). The coefficient for the bottom fourth of PC1
is insignificantly different from zero. In line with the basic hypotheses and argu-
ments advanced previously, this would suggest that the difference in information
quality between the stock-market indicator and the accounting indicators is ran-
dom when market-discipline conditions are poorly satisfied. A tentative explana-
tion for this finding is that both types of indicator are ‘just as bad’ when the
institutional environment is sufficiently poor. This explanation conflicts some-
what with the assumption that the benchmark measures are invariant to MD
conditions, but it would seem to be the most plausible explanation for this result.
Notwithstanding the indeterminate result for the first quartile in specification (5),
the overall impression from all regressions reported in Table 7 is that the diver-
gence between stock return volatility and accounting risk is a negative function
of the conditions for market discipline, but that the negative slope becomes
increasingly flat as conditions improve. The implication is that accounting meas-
ures of risk are a priori more informative, but the difference in informativeness
becomes successively less important.
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Table 7. Results of regressions of stock return volatility divergence on conditions for 
market discipline
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS regressions of the squared standardized residual from
model 3 in Table 5 on various combinations of the first six principal components of the conditions for market
discipline (PC1-PC6). Model 5 reports coefficient estimates from a piecewise linear regression on the first
principal component, where the distribution of the independent variable is split into four even quartiles.
T-statistics in parentheses are based on White standard errors robust to contemporaneous correlation and
cross-section heteroscedasticity.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence level.
5.2.3. Z-score divergence
The results from regressions of Z-score divergence on the conditions for market
discipline (Table 8) impart the overall impression of a monotonically increasing
divergence between the Z-score and the accounting-based benchmarks over the
entire distribution of MD conditions. The first principal component of the condi-
tions for market discipline has a consistently positive and highly significant coef-
ficient for specifications (1)-(4). The quadratic PC1 terms in specifications (3) and
(4), on the other hand, are small and statistically insignificant. The piecewise
specification on the first principal component, finally, seems to suggest that diver-
gence increases the most over low-to-medium ranges of MD conditions, but the
parameter estimates for this specification are jointly insignificant (as shown by
the regression F).
12345
Intercept 0.60 (7.80)*** 0.62 (7.23)*** 0.52 (7.20)*** 0.51 (6.29)*** 0.49 (5.09)***
PC1 -0.14 (-4.07)*** -0.13 (-4.04)*** -0.14 (-4.27)*** -0.13 (-4.34)***
PC12 0.017 (4.42)*** 0.022 (2.42)**
PC2 0.060 (2.56)** 0.074 (2.55)**
PC3 -0.015 (-0.83) 0.035 (0.95)
PC4 0.080 (1.45) -0.039 (-2.12)**
PC5 -0.053 (-2.34)** 0.050 (4.56)***
PC6 0.10 (3.09)*** 0.084 (2.41)**
PC1 – Q1 -0.071 (-1.27)
PC1 – Q2 -0.24 (-3.01)***
PC1 – Q3 -0.13 (-2.47)**
PC1 – Q4 -0.043
(-2.71)***
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Regression F 47.0*** 9.49*** 25.7*** 8.88*** 15.0***
No. of 
observations
1489 1489 1489 1489 1489
No. of banks 282 282 282 282 282
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The overall insignificance of specification (5), along with the very small R2’s in
specifications (1) and (3), suggests that the first principal component explains
considerably less of the Z-score divergence than the divergence of stock return
volatility and sub-debt spreads. The higher-order principal components
(PC2-PC6), on the other hand, seem to add considerably to the explanatory
power of the regressions (without necessarily clarifying the relationship between
Z-score divergence and overall MD conditions).
The implication of the results – in accordance with the hypotheses laid out in this
paper – would be that the Z-score is always more informative on bank risk than
accounting-based risk indicators. However, given the relatively low capacity of
the most overall measure of MD conditions (viz. the first principal component)
to explain this difference in informativeness, the message needs perhaps to be
nuanced somewhat.
One explanation could lie in the fact that the Z-score is a combination measure,
incorporating both market and accounting data. Keeping this in mind, a possible
implication of the result could run along the lines that combination measures
capture information not contained in more one-dimensional measures of risk,
and the market can always produce valuable complementary information
(regardless of the level of institutional quality).
This line of interpretation would suggest that the results here obtained substanti-
ate the results of previous research – by, e.g., Berger et al. (2000), Evanoff and
Wall (2001), Gunther et al. (2001), and Gropp et al. (2006) – which has also
concluded that information impounded in market measures of risk could provide
an important complementary signal of banks’ financial health, and thus has
pointed to the potential value of indirect market discipline in bank supervision.
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Table 8. Results of regressions of market Z-score divergence on conditions for market 
discipline
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS regressions of the squared standardized residual from
model 4 in Table 5 on various combinations of the first six principal components of the conditions for market
discipline (PC1-PC6). Model 5 reports coefficient estimates from a piecewise linear regression on the first
principal component, where the distribution of the independent variable is split into four even quartiles.
T-statistics in parentheses are based on White standard errors robust to contemporaneous correlation and
cross-section heteroscedasticity.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence level.
5.2.4. Regressions on individual conditions for market discipline
As an additional robustness test of the results, and as a means to clarify the
results, I ran regressions of the three divergence measures extracted from the
stage-one regressions on an individual proxy of the conditions of market disci-
pline. The proxy used as regressor in these additional stage-two regressions is the
‘no-bailout credibility’ variable. It was chosen on the grounds that it is a
bank-level variable, has a low weight in the first principal component of MD
conditions (and thus so far ‘untested’), and has a relatively ‘clean’ interpretation
in terms of its impact on the viability of market-based measures of risk. I ran one
linear and one quadratic specification for each divergence measure (equivalent to
specifications [1] and [3] in Tables 6-8). The results are reported in Table 9.
12345
Intercept 0.78 (7.25)*** 0.96 (6.01)*** 0.85 (4.17)*** 0.95 (4.69)*** 0.82 (4.30)***
PC1 0.086 (2.90)*** 0.15 (3.21)*** 0.082 (2.25)** 0.15 (2.88)***
PC12 -0.014 (-0.58) 0.001 (0.042)
PC2 0.63 (3.58)*** 0.63 (3.59)***
PC3 -0.047 (-1.01) -0.045 (-0.94)
PC4 -0.041 (-0.39) -0.040 (-0.41)
PC5 0.13 (2.41)** 0.13 (2.15)**
PC6 0.26 (6.48)*** 0.26 (7.66)***
PC1 – Q1 0.10 (2.11)**
PC1 – Q2 0.13 (2.16)**
PC1 – Q3 0.13 (0.80)
PC1 – Q4 -0.000 (-0.002)
Adj. R2 0.003 0.06 0.002 0.06 0.002
Regression F 4.65** 17.7*** 2.75* 15.1*** 1.62
No. of 
observations
1483 1483 1483 1483 1483
No. of banks 282 282 282 282 282
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Table 9. Regressions on individual conditions for market discipline
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS regressions of the squared standardized residuals from
model 1 (sub-debt spread divergence), model 3 (stock-return volatility divergence), and model 4 (Z-score
divergence) in Table 5 on an index of ‘no-bailout credibility’. T-statistics in parentheses are based on White
standard errors robust to contemporaneous correlation and cross-section heteroscedasticity.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence level.
Sub-debt spread divergence displays a negative average relationship with
no-bailout credibility, but when the quadratic term is introduced again proves to
be a convex function, in accordance both with the hypotheses advanced and with
the results obtained earlier when the first principal component was used as regres-
sor. The estimated relationship suggests that sub-debt spread divergence drops for
the initial two thirds of the distribution of no-bailout credibility, but then bottoms
out and turns positive for the top third of the distribution. The function hits its
minimum at around 3.5, which is close to the mean value for no-bailout credibil-
ity.
Stock return volatility divergence instead shows a positive overall relationship
with no-bailout credibility, but as indicated by the very low adjusted R2’s and the
insignificance of all regressors in the quadratic specification, the association is
relatively weak. The conclusion would be that this particular dimension of the
conditions for market discipline is less important than those dimensions captured
in the first principal components.
Z-score divergence, finally, appears to be positively related to no-bailout credibil-
ity on average, but allowing for non-linearity, the posited convex relationship
emerges. The estimated coefficients in specification (2) for Z-score divergence are
similar to those estimated for sub-debt spread divergence, although the function
reaches its minimum somewhat earlier (which explains why the estimated rela-
tionship is positive on average). Comparing these results with those obtained with
the first principal component of MD conditions as the primary explanatory var-
iable, it is clear that the no-bailout condition has a higher power to explain the
Dependent variable




































Adj. R2 0.03 0.05 0.004 0.004 0.02 0.03
Regression F 8.18*** 7.89*** 8.58*** 4.32** 42.2*** 28.6***
No. of obs. 259 259 1823 1823 1773 1773
No. of banks 96 96 348 348 346 346
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difference in informativeness between the Z-score and accounting variables than
those proxies of MD conditions that have a high weight in PC1.
Again, a possible explanation of the finding that the Z-score more often has a
higher informativeness than the benchmark indicators is that it incorporates
information contained in both market prices and accounting data. These two
types of information could be complementary even when the institutional envi-
ronment is not good enough to make market-based measures individually ‘better’
than accounting-based indicators of bank risk.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The potential merits of market discipline in banking have often been assessed
empirically by focusing on the monitoring aspect of market discipline – that is,
the extent to which prices on banks’ securities reflect the risk of the issuing bank-
ing organization. Two main approaches have been adopted: the ‘risk sensitivity’
approach (where various indicators of risk derived from market prices are
regressed on benchmark risk measures, such as different accounting ratios, or
credit ratings), and the ‘early warning’ approach (where market-based risk meas-
ures are tested as predictors, or leading indicators, of bank distress, defined in
some way). The overall results are relatively inconclusive, and each approach has
its methodological problems. I have focused on the former approach in this paper.
In this approach, one previously largely overlooked problem is that both market-
based risk measures and the benchmark indicators commonly used are imperfect
proxies of ‘true’ risk. Therefore, absence of a significant association between a
market signal and benchmark risk indicators could result either because market
prices do not adequately reflect risk, or because market prices in fact incorporate
the available information on banks’ risk better than other available measures.
The problem is thus that it is not possible to observe which of the indicators that
is more informative about the bank’s ‘true’ risk. What is possible to observe,
though, is how well the institutional setting in a particular market is geared
toward inducing market discipline. In the paper, I suggested a simple measure of
informativeness divergence between a market signal and benchmark risk meas-
ures, and showed that – although it cannot be observed directly – it is possible to
infer from the function projecting this measure onto a proxy of the extent to
which the conditions for market discipline are satisfied which one of the measures
that is more informative.
Applying the methodology to a panel of several hundred banks worldwide, with
the divergence measure calculated on the basis of three common market-based
risk indicators, I find that market-based measures as stand-alone variables are less
informative than accounting indicators for most levels of institutional quality.
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Stock return volatility is never more informative than accounting measures, but
spreads on subordinated debt may be more informative if the conditions for mar-
ket discipline are well satisfied (for the top 25-30 percent of the observed distri-
bution). This finding raises the question if the failure to find significant associa-
tions between subordinated-debt spreads and accounting data in some studies
using US data is driven by lower information content in accounting data than in
spreads (rather than the other way around, which is the common interpretation).
A combination measure incorporating both stock market data and accounting
data, finally, is more informative than accounting variables alone for most levels
of institutional quality (although the most overall measure of institutional quality
used seems to be a relatively weak determinant of the difference in informative-
ness between the combination risk indicator and the benchmarks). This result is
consistent with the results of some previous studies comparing the relative
informativeness of different risk indicators, which seem to imply that stock-mar-
ket data contains information that is complementary to accounting data and
other commonly used benchmark risk measures.
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APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF AN EXPRESSION FOR VAR(W)
A bank’s ‘true’ risk is denoted by P (with mean   and constant variance). P is
unknown, but there are two approximate indicators of P: a market-based indica-
tor, M, and a benchmark indicator, B. From the hypothetical regressions
(A1)
and
,( A 2 )
define the informativeness of M and B, respectively, as  , and
.
Because P is unknown,   and   are also unknown, and therefore it is not
possible to observe directly whether M or B is the more informative indicator of
P (i.e., if   or  ).
By (A1) and (A2), the simplified ‘risk-sensitivity’ regression represented by
equation (1) in section 3.1 can be rewritten as
.( A 3 )
Rearranging and simplifying yields
(A4)
where the lower-case p denotes deviations from the mean,  ,
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Since   and   are necessarily positive,   is a positive function of both
 and  . The covariance between u and v,  , will typically affect
 negatively, since   provided M and B are
positively correlated to each other and to P.
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APPENDIX B. TECHNICAL NOTE ON THE ESTIMATION 
PROCEDURE
B.1. The estimation procedure as an unobserved variables 
methodology
Let m be a market-based measure of bank risk, b a vector of benchmark risk
measures, and z  a vector of control variables accounting for known (and
observed) differences in variation between m and b that are unrelated to the con-
ditions for market discipline. Market and non-market measures do not contain
exactly the same amount of information, so that   + bβ + zγ + q,
where q captures the difference in informativeness between m and b. Because this
difference is unknown, q is unobserved. In this framework, a ‘risk-sensitivity’
regression can be formulated as:
 + bβ + zγ + w, (B1)
where   is a random error term. If q is strictly additive and uncorrelated with b,
z, a regular OLS regression on the above equation will produce consistent esti-
mates of β and γ. By the inclusion of the intercept term, nothing of the informa-
tion contained in q is lost, but it does normalize q so that   =   =   =
0.
With q still unobserved, it can be proxied by  , since the only other component
of   is a random error, but because   varies around zero, the actual values –
positive or negative – do not reveal which measure is more informative, m or b.
However, as argued in subsection 3.1, the (absolute) magnitude of the ‘diver-
gence’ between m and b, measured as  ,18 may vary systematically with the
extent to which the conditions for market discipline are satisfied. Thus, the sec-
ond-step estimations – regressing   on a proxy of   – is an approximate way
of testing the relationship between the absolute value of q and the conditions for
market discipline.
B.2. Discussion of corrections for panel data
As regards the first-step regressions (equation [2] in section 4.1), the (unbalanced)
panel structure of the data introduces some minor issues that need to be
addressed. In order not to lose information, the unobserved variable q should be
allowed to vary both over time and across firms, but should not be correlated
with b, z. Period effects need to be added to account for changes over time that
18 In order to make the divergence measure comparable for different market-based measures (i.e., comparable for
different regressions of the type represented by equation B1, above), the squared standardized residuals are used
as divergence measure in this paper.
Embz , [] α =
m α = wqε + ≡
ε
Eq [] E ε [] Ew []
w ˆ
w ˆ w ˆ
w ˆ 2
w ˆ 2 CMD
SUERF2011_4.book  Page 46  Friday, December 2, 2011  1:54 PMDIVERGENCE OF RISK INDICATORS AND THE CONDITIONS FOR MARKET DISCIPLINE IN BANKING 47
larcier
affect all banks equally, but they must be fixed in the cross-section dimension.
Adding firm-specific effects, on the other hand, might pick up a significant
amount of the information I hope to extract from   (insofar as variation in MD
conditions is observed at firm-level), so cross-section effects should not be used.
Correcting only for a (fixed) time effect will result in serial correlation in  ,
which is ‘desirable’ to the extent that q is expected to be serially correlated and
contain firm-specific information which is more or less time-invariant. Since
inference on β and γ is not the primary objective, inference-related issues could,
in principle, be left aside so long as they are of no direct consequence for produc-
ing consistent estimates of β and γ and thus a   which is as informative and as
good a proxy of q as possible. Nonetheless, since inference at least on β may be
of (secondary)19 interest in itself, standard errors should be corrected for within-
cross-section serial correlation.
While for the estimations producing the divergence measures, the necessary panel
adjustments are thus more or less given by the underlying assumptions and the
objectives of the regressions, for the second-stage regressions (equations [3-5] in
section 4.1), they are more of an open issue. Because (fixed) time effects are
accounted for in the first-stage regressions, I expect they are of little importance
in the residuals obtained from these regressions. Cross-section effects, on the
other hand, were considered inappropriate given the small number of observa-
tions over time relative to the number of cross-section units (I actually have a
single observation for several banks, especially for the divergence measure of
sub-debt spreads, for which I have the smallest number of observations). While
using cross-section effects would push up the overall explanatory value of the
second-stage regressions, interpretation of the coefficients on the principal com-
ponent(s) of MD conditions would be made difficult with a large portion of the
cross-sectional variation being picked up by the cross-section effects. I thus esti-
mate the equations without either period or cross-section effects, but correct
standard errors for contemporaneous correlation and cross-section heteroscedas-
ticity.
19 The conclusions one can draw from inference on these regressions are limited, since factors known to influence
the relationship between the market-based measure and the benchmark measures – in particular, any number
of proxies for the extent to which the conditions for market discipline are satisfied – are deliberately left out, in
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APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL DATA TABLES
Table C1. Distribution of banks by country
Country Number of banks
Average sizea of 
included banks in 2005




conditions of included 
banks in 2005b
Argentina 4 4,853 2 -3.09
Australia 9 55,698 9 2.84
Austria 4 18,625 4 -0.68
Brazil 14 13,558 6 -3.79
Canada 9 90,587 8 4.41
Chile 5 14,229 3 -1.14
Colombia 11 2,244 1 -3.48
Czech Republic 1 20,942 0 -2.60
Denmark 40 847 25 2.11
Egypt 20 978 1 -2.41
Finland 2 8,201 2 2.06
France 11 22,495 5 1.08
Germany 16 11,632 8 -0.10
Greece 10 13,638 5 -0.63
Hong Kong 7 15,165 3 5.12
Hungary 2 5,265 2 -2.64
India 37 13,051 10 -2.73
Indonesia 22 4,154 9 -3.28
Ireland 5 127,953 5 2.30
Israel 8 16,406 5 0.06
Italy 19 28,383 13 -0.78
Japan 87 19,133 54 0.91
Kenya 7 575 0 -4.79
South Korea 8 33,349 3 -1.31
Lithuania 4 955 3 -1.70
Malaysia 3 28,277 3 0.53
Malta 4 1,425 1 -0.21
Morocco 5 6,241 1 -2.79
Netherlands 1 1,039,000 1 4.59
Pakistan 20 1,345 8 -2.94
Peru 9 948 3 -2.19
Philippines 15 1,626 8 -2.11
Poland 12 6,548 2 -2.96
Portugal 3 73,289 3 0.28
Romania 3 1,472 1 -3.43
Singapore 2 71,652 2 3.33
South Africa 2 5,477c 1- 1 . 6 6 d
Spain 14 25,982 9 1.78
Sri Lanka 7 658 4 n.a.
Sweden 2 217,181 2 2.92
Switzerland 6 6,780 3 3.90
Taiwan 15 11,636 5 -0.46
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n.a.: Not available.
Notes: a) Total assets in millions of USD. b) Index of the conditions for market discipline given by the first principal component
of variables listed in Table A3, Panel B. A higher value indicates better conditions for market discipline. Total sample observations
on the index run between -6.69 and 5.78 and have zero mean. c) Refers to average size in 2004 (no observations for 2005). d)
Refers to average MD conditions in 2002 (no observations for 2003-2005).
Table C2. Distribution of observations on market-based risk measures over time
Thailand 13 7,679 11 -1.48
Turkey 12 8,183 3 -2.78
United Kingdom 3 18,409 2 4.48
United States 15 3,511 6 3.34
Venezuela 14 1,027 0 -4.78
Year Risk measure, number of obs’s
Sub-debt spreads Stock return volatility Market Z-score
1994 10 299 0
1995 10 333 1
1996 14 344 1
1997 23 375 23
1998 34 395 227
1999 38 415 273
2000 51 431 301
2001 61 448 321
2002 70 461 341
2003 89 475 357
2004 103 489 433
2005 134 499 410
Country Number of banks
Average sizea of 
included banks in 2005




conditions of included 
banks in 2005b
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Table C3, Panel A. Risk measures (market- and accounting-based) and control variables
Variable Description Source
Market-based risk measures
Subordinated debt spreads Spread over equal-maturity riskfree 
rate of yields on the bank’s 
subordinated bonds or notes, in 
basis points
Datastream, Reuters
Stock return volatility Standard deviation of daily equity 
returns (calculated for each year)
Datastream
Z-score (Average return on equity – equity 
capital over total assets) divided by 




Leverage One minus the equity share of total 
assets
BankScope
Non-performing loans Non-performing loans divided by 
equity capital
As above
Liquid assets Liquid assets divided by total assets As above
Return on assets (ROA) Net earnings divided by total assets As above
Bank-level control variables
Deposits Deposits divided by total assets As above
Net interest margin Interest income over interest 
expenditure
As above
Cost/income ratio Total costs divided by total income As above
Country-level control variables
Real interest rate Real interest rate World Development Indicators
Inflation Annual change in consumer prices As above
Growth Real GDP growth As above
Systemic financial crisis Dummy variable equal to one if the 
country was undergoing a systemic 
financial crisis, zero otherwise
Honohan and Laeven (2005); 
Laeven and Valencia (2008)
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Table C4. Pairwise correlations, bank-level benchmark risk measures and control 
variables












ROA -0.423 -0.463 0.185
Deposit share 0.512 0.216 -0.124 -0.236
Net interest margin -0.361 -0.219 0.149 0.385 -0.189
Cost/income ratio 0.049 0.142 0.035 -0.412 0.004 -0.024












Share of formally insured debt -0.024
No-bailout credibility -0.049 -0.171
Institutional ownership 0.140 -0.045 -0.273
Inside ownership -0.060 -0.002 -0.032 -0.344
Excess capital 0.088 -0.118 0.278 -0.003 0.067
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Table C6. Estimation results of the sub-debt sample selection model
The table shows coefficient estimates from a pooled probit regression of the selection indicator (a dummy variable
indicating if the bank had sub-debt outstanding during the observation year) on bank- and country-level
regressorsa. T-statistics in parentheses are based on regular probit standard errors (and should therefore be
interpreted with caution, given the panel structure of the dataset). Observation-specific estimates of the inverse
Mills ratio from this model were used as an additional explanatory variable in Table 5’s model (2) to account for
possible sample-selection bias.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence level.
Note: a) To my knowledge, Covitz et al. (2004) were first to use the Heckman (1979) two-step approach to correct for
sample-selection bias in the context of risk-sensitivity tests on sub-debt spreads. They estimate a model where the bank’s decision
to issue sub-debt is a function of the bank’s own risk level, macroeconomic and market conditions, firm-specific advantages, and
the regulatory pressure to issue. I based the above model on that general structure, and variables are grouped accordingly in the
table. Proxies for bank risk and macroeconomic variables need no explanation or motivation. Firm-specific advantages are
summarized by the lagged sub-debt dummy (used also by Covitz et al., 2004) since it can reasonably be assumed that this variable
is strongly serially correlated within cross-section units; Covitz et al. (2004) use examination ratings to measure regulatory
pressure to issue capital (which could be at least in part sub-debt); such ratings are not available for cross-country samples, and
I instead use the undercapitalization dummy to proxy for the pressure to issue.
Dependent variable: Sub-debt dummy
Leverage 6.47 (5.89)***
Non-performing loans -0.12 (-1.98)**
Liquid assets -0.43 (-1.73)*
Return on assets (ROA) 0.064 (0.020)
Real interest rate 0.90 (1.82)*
Inflation -0.49 (-0.81)
Growth 0.22 (0.17)
(Sub-debt dummy)t – 1 2.76 (32.7)***
Undercapitalization dummy 0.58 (4.15)***
Intercept -6.93 (-6.79)***
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.59
Regression likelihood ratio 2030***
No. of observations (of which dep. var. = 1) 2496 (1228)
No. of banks 437
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APPENDIX D.




Equity return volatility (various definitions) Brewer and Mondschean (1994); Hall et al. (2001); James (1988, 1990)
Abnormal equity returns (market model)a Berger and Davies (1998); Berger et al. (2000); Birchler and Hancock 
(2004); Bliss and Flannery (2002); Gropp and Richards (2001); Krainer 
and Lopez (2004); Pettway (1976, 1980); Pettway and Sinkey (1980)
Beta (CAPM or market model) Gunther et al. (2001); Hall et al. (2001)
Other, equity-based Bliss and Flannery (2002); Ellis and Flannery (1992); Hall et al. (2001); 
Krainer and Lopez (2004)
Debt-based
Primary-market spreads on subordinated notes and 
bonds
Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); Goyal (2005); Morgan and Stiroh (2001); 
Sironi (2002, 2003)
Secondary-market spreads on subordinated notes 
and bonds
Avery et al. (1988); Birchler and Hancock (2004); Covitz et al. (2004); 
DeYoung et al. (2001); Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); Evanoff and Wall 
(2001, 2002); Flannery and Sorescu (1996); Gorton and Santomero 
(1990); Gropp et al. (2006); Jagtiani et al. (2002); Krishnan et al. (2006); 
Pop (2006)
Interest rate spreads on large certificates of deposit 
(CDs)
Brewer and Mondschean (1994); Ellis and Flannery (1992); Hall et al. 
(2004); Hannan and Hanweck (1988); James (1988, 1990); Jordan 
(2000); Keeley (1990)
Other, debt-basedb Birchler and Hancock (2004); Bliss and Flannery (2002); Gropp and 
Richards (2001); Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001); Park (1995); 
Park and Perestiani (1998); Pop (2006)
Accounting-based risk indicators
Capital-structure-based
Leverage, or capital ratio (various definitions, e.g. 
equity/total assets, liabilities/market or book value 
of equity, etc.)
Avery et al. (1988); Berger et al. (2000); Birchler and Hancock (2004); 
Bliss and Flannery (2002); Brewer and Mondschean (1994); Covitz et al. 
(2004); DeYoung et al. (2001); Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); Evanoff and 
Wall (2001, 2002); Flannery and Sorescu (1996); Goyal (2005); Gropp 
et al. (2006); Gunther et al. (2001); Hall et al. (2001, 2004); Hannan and 
Hanweck (1988); Jagtiani et al. (2002); James (1988); Keeley (1990); 
Krainer and Lopez (2004); Krishnan et al. (2006); Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler (2001); Morgan and Stiroh (2001); Park and Peristiani 
(1998); Park (1995); Sironi (2003)
Debt or deposit structurec Bliss and Flannery (2002); Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); Gunther et al. 
(2001); Hall et al. (2004); Jagtiani et al. (2002); Park (1995)
Loan- or asset-structure-based
Non-performing loans or similar (non-accruing 
loans, loans past due, etc)/total assets
Avery et al. (1988); Berger and Davies (1998); Berger et al. (2000); 
Birchler and Hancock (2004); Bliss and Flannery (2002); Covitz et al. 
(2004); DeYoung et al. (2001); Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); Flannery 
and Sorescu (1996); Gorton and Santomero (1990); Gropp et al. (2006); 
Gunther et al. (2001); Hall et al. (2001, 2004); Jagtiani et al. (2002); 
Krainer and Lopez (2004); Krishnan et al. (2006); Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler (2001); Morgan and Stiroh (2001); Park and Peristiani 
(1998); Park (1995)
Loan-loss provisions or loan-loss reserves/total 
loans or total assets
Avery et al. (1988); Baumann and Nier (2003); Berger and Davies (1998); 
Bliss and Flannery (2002); Bongini et al. (2002); Gunther et al. (2001); 
James (1988); Krainer and Lopez (2004); Krishnan et al. (2006); Sironi 
(2003)
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Notes:
a) Used to detect market reactions to events or information that may signal changes in bank risk, rather than as an explicit risk
indicator.
b) Regular deposit interest rates, spreads on senior bonds, etc.
c) Jumbo or brokered CDs/total assets, insured deposits/total assets, etc.
d) Loan assets/total assets, commercial and industrial loans/total assets, residential real estate loans/total assets, renegotiated
loans/total assets, etc.
e) Liquid assets/total assets, fixed or tangible assets/total assets, trading assets or investment securities/total assets, repossessed
assets/total assets, etc.
f) Used mainly as a control variable.
g) These indicators use both market prices and accounting data; the category includes option-pricing-based measures (implied
volatility, implicit deposit insurance premium, etc.) and the Z-score used in this paper.
h) These are composite ratings assigned by the US federal supervisory agencies following on-site examinations of banking firms
(CAMEL) or BHCs (BOPEC). They are thus only applicable to US datasets.
Other, loan structured Avery et al. (1988); Bliss and Flannery (2002); Brewer and Mondschean 
(1994); Hall et al. (2004); James (1990); Krishnan et al. (2006); Martin 
(1977); Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001); Morgan and Stiroh 
(2001); Park and Peristiani (1998)
Non-loan asset structuree Avery et al. (1988); Birchler and Hancock (2004); Bliss and Flannery 
(2002); Bongini et al. (2002); Brewer and Mondschean (1994); Covitz et 
al. (2004); DeYoung et al. (2001); Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); Flannery 
and Sorescu (1996); Gunther et al. (2001); Hall et al. (2001, 2004); 
Krainer and Lopez (2004); Martin (1977); Martinez Peria and Schmukler 
(2001); Morgan and Stiroh (2001); Park and Peristiani (1998); Park 
(1995); Saunders et al. (1990); Sironi (2003)
Profitability-based
Return on assetsf Avery et al. (1988); Berger et al. (2000); Bliss and Flannery (2002); 
Bongini et al. (2002); DeYoung et al. (2001); Evanoff and Jagtiani 
(2004); Flannery and Sorescu (1996); Gropp et al. (2006); Gunther et al. 
(2001); Hall et al. (2001, 2004); Jagtiani et al. (2002); Krainer and Lopez 
(2004); Krishnan et al. (2006); Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001); 
Morgan and Stiroh (2001); Park and Peristiani (1998); Park (1995); 
Sironi (2003)
Earnings volatility Avery et al. (1988)
Other, accounting-based Birchler and Hancock (2004); Bongini et al. (2002); Covitz et al. (2004); 
DeYoung et al. (2001); Flannery and Sorescu (1996); Gorton and 
Santomero (1990); Gropp et al. (2006); Hall et al. (2001); James (1988); 
Morgan and Stiroh (2001) 
Combination measuresg Bongini et al. (2002); Gorton and Santomero (1990); Gropp et al. 
(2006); Gunther et al. (2001); Hannan and Hanweck (1988); Krainer 
and Lopez (2004)
Ratings
Rating agencies’ bond issue ratings Berger et al. (2000); DeYoung et al. (2001); Flannery and Sorescu (1996); 
Goyal (2005); Gropp and Richards (2001); Jagtiani et al. (2002); 
Krishnan et al. (2006); Morgan and Stiroh (2001); Sironi (2002, 2003)
Rating agencies’ issuer (bank) ratings Avery et al. (1988); Bongini et al. (2002); Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); 
Gropp et al. (2006); Pop (2006); Sironi (2002, 2003)
Examination/supervisory ratings 
(CAMEL/BOPEC)h
Berger and Davies (1998); Berger et al. (2000); DeYoung et al. (2001); 
Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); Evanoff and Wall (2001, 2002); Gunther et 
al. (2001); Hall et al. (2001); Jagtiani et al. (2002); Krainer and Lopez 
(2004); Krishnan et al. (2006)
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SUERF – SOCIÉTÉ UNIVERSITAIRE EUROPÉENNE DE 
RECHERCHES FINANCIÈRES
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who have
an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems, and the
conduct of monetary and regulatory policy. SUERF is a network association of
central bankers, bankers and other practitioners in the financial sector, and aca-
demics with the purpose of analysing and understanding European financial mar-
kets, institutions and systems, and the conduct of regulation and monetary policy.
It organises regular Colloquia, lectures and seminars and each year publishes sev-
eral analytical studies in the form of SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located at
the Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual corporate, per-
sonal and academic institution membership fees. Corporate membership cur-
rently includes major European financial institutions and Central Banks. SUERF
is strongly supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership comprises
most of Europe’s Central Banks (including the Bank for International Settle-




For details of SUERF Studies published prior to 2010 (Nos. 1 to 22 and 2003/1-
2009/5) please consult the SUERF website at www.suerf.org.
2010
2010/1 Crisis Management at cross-roads – Challenges facing cross-border
financial institutions at the EU level, edited by Rym Ayadi, Morten
Balling and Frank Lierman, Vienna 2010, ISBN 978-3-902109-51-4
2010/2 The Quest for stability: the macro view, edited by Morten Balling,
Jan Marc Berk and Marc-Olivier Strauss-Kahn, Vienna 2010, 978-
3-902109-52-1
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2010/3 The Quest for stability: the view of financial institutions, edited by
Morten Balling, Jan Marc Berk and Marc-Olivier Strauss-Kahn,
Vienna 2010, 978-3-902109-53-8
2010/4 The Quest for stability: The financial stability view, edited by
Morten Balling, Jan Marc Berk and Marc-Olivier Strauss-Kahn,
Vienna 2010, 978-3-902109-54-5
2010/5 Contagion and Spillovers: New Insights from the Crisis, edited by
Peter Backé, Ernest Gnan and Philipp Hartmann, Vienna, 978-3-
902109-55-2
2011
2011/1 The Future of Banking in CESEE after the Financial Crisis, edited
by Attilla Csajbók and Ernest Gnan, Vienna 2011, ISBN 978-3-
902109-56-9
2011/2 Regulation and Banking after the Crisis, edited by Frank Browne,
David T. Llewellyn and Philip Molyneux, Vienna 2011, ISBN 978-
3-902109-57-6
2011/3 Monetary Policy after the Crisis, edited by Ernest Gnan, Ryszard
Kokoszczynski, Tomasz Łyziak and Robert McCauley, Vienna
2011, ISBN 978-3-902109-58-3
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